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The following is the “First Draft” version of a paper now being published in a much revised version in *Leidschrift*, a well-established journal which publishes in Dutch, English and other languages. Such well known authors as Charles Tilly, Lynn McDonald, Jan de Vries, Leonard Blussé, and Wim Blockmans have published in *Leidschrift* in the past. This draft version of the paper was also submitted to the Comparative-Historical Sociology section of the American Sociological Association for the 2009 ASA Conference that is being held in August in San Francisco, California.

“The Netherlands Indies in Aceh, Bali and Buton: Degrees of Resistance and Acceptance of Indirect and Direct Rule” *

ABSTRACT (summary)

An interesting contrast in resistance to empire can be gathered by examining more than one case. This chapter is limited to three cases. Those cases provide a more variegated picture than that found in many accounts of resistance to European colonialism and imperialism. In Buton (Butung), which had contact with the VOC in the seventeenth century (Schoorl 1987, 2001), the relatively low level of economic development meant that there was little resistance, and even passive acceptance, especially since the Islamic Butonese and Munanese of Southeast Sulawesi stood to gain power relative to the Islamic Makassar and Buginese in South Sulawesi (Celebes). But in Bali two local “princes” who had remained independent until early in the twentieth century resisted by leading the mass suicide (*puputan*) of hundreds of followers, while others accepted the N.E. I. take-over through indirect and then direct rule as a *fait accompli*. None of the resistance struggles in Bali, however, were comparable in strength and effectiveness to the struggles by Islamic groups in Aceh, Northern Sumatra. The narrative must include a range of responses to V.O.C. and N.E.I. indirect and direct rule by leaders and peasants, from hard-fought military resistance (and militarily ineffective symbolic resistance), on the one hand, to reluctant (and even grateful) acceptance, on the other. There is quite a contrast, for example, between the extremes of the resistance of the Acehnese Muslim military guerillas and the acceptance by the Muslim Munanese. No one has yet examined in detail the trends of thousands of Bajo “sea gypsy” groups. The general context involves not only capitalist imperialism but also a clash between Buddhist-Hindu and Islamic Civilizations, on the one hand, and European secular nation-state principles, embodied in the Republic of Indonesia today, on the other. Imagined “mythic” communities (Anderson 1983) that allegedly existed before Europeans came to the archipelago play a significant role in how resistance has been conceived.

www.semioticsigns.com Bakker (2009)

* This chapter constitutes a kind of overview summary and draws on but does not attempt to summarize many different articles I have written over the years. Some of the research on which this chapter is based was sponsored by L.I.P.I. (*Lembaga Ilmu Pegetahuan Indonesia* [Indonesian Institute of Science) and *Bangdes* [Department of Village Development] *Direktorat Jenderal Cipta Karya* [[Directorat General of Development]. I would like to thank Syed Farid Alatas, Stan Barrett, Howard Beers, Franz and Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Eleanora Cebotarev, Lawrence Cross, Harry Cummings, Chris Dagg, Cees Fasseur, Andre Gunder Frank, Maurice Godelier, Geoff Hainsworth, Anthony H. Johns, Sartono Kartodirdjo, William R. Liddle, Lorna Marsden, Radhakrishna Menon, John R. W. Smail, Wayne Thompson, Charles Tilly, V. D. Trivadi, Robert Van Niel, Jack Wayne, Willem F. Wertheim, Abdul Mulku Zaharia and Irving Zeitlin. They have all helped me in significant ways with my work on Indonesia and Indic Civilization during the last forty years. This chapter is dedicated to the memory of W... from the Besaki Temple area, Bali, and the good work of the Y.K.I. [*Yayasan Kesehatan Indonesia* (Indonesian Institute for Health) and John Fawcett Foundation; www.balieye.org].

I. Introduction: Bali, Buton and Aceh as Case Examples:

At the Monash University annual lecture series organized by Bambang Pranowo and M. C. Ricklefs and held in Clayton, Australia, in 1989, Helius Sjamsudden delivered a paper on “Islam and Resistance in South and Central Kalimantan in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries.” His paper summarizes aspects of his Monash University dissertation on resistance (Sjamsudden 1989a). In a sense, this paper is a kind of dialogue with Sjamsudden’s excellent work. His published paper (Sjamsudden 1989b) contains many important insights about Islamisation in Banjarmasin and among inland Dayaks like the Bakumpais, a sub-group of the Ngajus. I read Sjamsudden’s paper with the greatest interest. It is sophisticated and based on detailed local information. I learned a great deal about the Dayak and that was fascinating to me since my parents lived on the west coast of Borneo in the 1930s and I grew up hearing about their experiences with Dayaks.¹

But I was also left feeling that the conceptual framework concerning resistance that is assumed by Helius Sjamsudden reflects bias. Sjamsuddin writes appreciatively concerning rebel hajis who utilized a version of jihad (or *fi sabil Allah*) as well as millenarian and nativistic beliefs against the “whiteman’s expansion.” He emphasizes the purity of those rural hajis who resisted versus the implicitly impure motives of urban, Banjarmasin “*hajis* with a vested interest in the Dutch side.” “They were more concerned about the continuity of their profitable trade than about the political problem faced by the Banjarmasin Sultanate” as a whole (Sjamsuddin 1989b: 11-12). Was it anti-Islamic for urban Islamic leaders in Banjarmasin itself to support the continuation of trade networks with Java and Singapore? Should trade outside of Kalimantan (Borneo) have been severely reduced? What would the long-term implications of reduced trade have been for rural people in the Sultanate as a whole? Is the use of tarekat (Islamic mystical Sufi brotherhood) to “heighten the fighting spirit” a more legitimate form of Islam? The

importance of “imagined communities” (or, imagined “nations” Anderson 1983) needs to be considered from various perspectives and at various levels, from micro (hamlet) to macro (nation and world system). Are the issues being analyzed in a balanced and scholarly manner by Sjamsuddin and other Indonesian scholars interested in resistance? Is there is bias involved in viewing resistance to the N.E.I. as always being in the short-term and long-term best interest of Indonesians?

The question is particularly poignant today since the Republic of Indonesia has made enormous strides in recent years. Yet many journalists and political commentators still maintain an attitude toward the federal government that is highly critical. The struggles in Aceh are often viewed by outsiders in ways that do not do full justice to the whole story. Framing the struggles within Indonesian Islam as one between so-called “traditionalist” and “modernist” versions of Islam, as Deliar Noer (1983: 186) points out, can be misleading. It is generally accepted that all Indonesian Muslims should follow Islamic law (*shari’ah*), but the precise interpretation of Islamic law (and “Muhammadan Law”) is a matter of dispute (Hooker 1983). What is clear is that the Republic of Indonesia’s historical background is very important for the future of that republic and that a Euro-centric (e.g. dogmatic Marxist) or “Orientalist” perspective (Said 1978) will not be constructive. But what is sometimes less clear is that an Islamo-centric perspective can also bias the history of a secular nation-state.

This chapter is merely a preliminary sketch of a very complex topic with an extensive literature in many languages. No doubt the topic of Islam and resistance in Indonesia will generate a great deal of discussion in coming years, as it already has done for a long time. The hypothesis I would like to play with is based on the speculative idea that resistance is not just a matter of opposition to Europeans and “whiteman’s expansion.”ⁱⁱ The factors that account for active resistance are complex. An explanation will require a detailed examination of all of the various linguistic, religious and ethnic communities in the archipelago (and elsewhere). A corollary to my speculative hypothesis is that resistance (and military struggles) are less likely when outside influences are experienced as a process of long-term assimilation of Worldviews (*Weltanschauungen*) and religious beliefs. That “assimilation,” in turn, is often possible because of perceived military and economic advantages of outside alliances.

It is not just a matter of the Europeans as the black hats and the Indonesians as the white hats. The history of Indonesia is far more complicated than that. Similarly, it is highly misleading to think that taking a scholarly, detached perspective inevitably leads to becoming an implicit (or even explicit) apologist for one or another ideology, such as the ideology of Dutch imperialism or Christian missionary expansion. While still under the New Order government of Suharto, Deliar Noer (1983: 198) wrote: “The widening gap between the Muslims and the government, and increasingly suspicious attitudes, can perhaps be related to Pancasila, the principles on which the state is founded. While almost everybody in Indonesia now agrees with Pancasila, the Muslims feel that the government want [sic] to ‘secularize’ the five principles; on the other hand, the government feels that the Muslims want to ‘Islamize’ them.” What Deliar Noer seems to not fully recognize is that the nation-state of Indonesia, founded on Pancasila, is inherently a “secular” nation-state. It was not founded as an Islamic state.

Thus, while it is very important to study the roots of resistance, it is equally relevant to examine the roots of non-resistance and open support. Some people in the archipelago

remained neutral or accepted aspects of European influence. A case in point is the Protestant Christian Minahassa. “Minahassa, on the northeastern peninsula of Sulawesi, was fringe territory of the sultanate of Ternate. It realized an independent existence through links to the Dutch and conversion to Christianity. ... The oldest treaty between tribal leaders and the Dutch, dating from 1679, defined land borders to west and east and freed the tribes from tax obligations to the sultan of Ternate” (Taylor 2003: 269). During the nineteenth century the population doubled and a high percentage of the population was baptized. Schools were established. A high degree of “rational legal bureaucracy” had set in by the 1890s.

The fascinating story of “Vernandel versus Sahelangi” (Drooglever 1991) makes an interesting contrast with the struggles going on at the same time in Aceh, and elsewhere. That conflict between a minor Dutch colonial official and a local Minahassan colonial official does not illustrate resistance so much as modern bureaucracy (Weber 1968). The case concerns an allegation about breach of rational legal norms of conduct (related to imposition of excessive corvee work and having sex with several young women) by a certain A. J. W. Vernandel. Vernandel was a thirty-four year old relative newcomer and a minor colonial official (*controleur*). A complaint was made by the aging Minahassan, Dutch-speaking Protestant Stephanus Sahelangi (*hukum besar* of the district of Passan Ratahan Ponosakan, sub-district Belang, whose monthly income was f175), about his direct, bureaucratic superior, Vernandel. The case was important enough for the Governor-General C. Pinacker Hordijk to eventually send a member of the Council of the Indies (Raad van Indie), named W. O. Gallois, to the Minahassa in March 1892. Gallois decided that the obligations imposed by Vernandel (*heerendiensten* and *cultuurdiensten*) were indeed too heavy. The obligations were normal but Vernandel imposed them too severely. The case hit the press in the Netherlands, in part because of the sex scandal and in part because Sahelangi himself wrote an article. Vernandel, against whom there were many complaints, was sent out of the region, but more effective reforms did not happen for another three decades or so. In the 1920s some people from Minahassa were members of the N.E.I. “congress” or people’s council founded in 1916 (*Volksraad*) and spoke out there against aspects of N.E.I. administration (Drooglever 1991: 140-141).

General overviews of the history of Southeast Asia (Steinberg et al. 1987) and Indonesia are excellent (Ricklefs 2001, Taylor 2003). The work that has been done on Islam (Wodward 1989), Aceh (e.g. Siegel 1979), North Sumatra (Reid 1969) and Bali (Robinson 1995, Geertz 1980) is stimulating and thought provoking. There has been less scholarly study of Buton (Schoorl 2001). What could I possibly add to the already abundant literature, except perhaps a few comments on the relatively under-studied islands of Buton and Muna?

Despite my awareness of the complexity of the task, when asked to contribute to this special issue of *Leidschrift* I jumped at the chance. First of all, I have very warm feelings about Leiden University since I was an undergraduate student at Leiden for one year (1967-68), a “junior year” that proved to be seminal for my further intellectual development in all kinds of ways. I was able, for example, to attend lectures by Professor J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong, which opened my mind to Structural Anthropology and the study of adat law (Benda-Beckmann and Strijbosch 1986). Secondly, while I have written a number of articles about Indonesian social history, especially aspects of Dutch colonialism in Java in the nineteenth century (Bakker 1985a, 1987, 1988), the

vicissitudes of my academic career have not allowed me to continue to focus on Indonesia. For example, the work that I did in Southeast Sulawesi in the 1980s remains largely in unpublished government reports (e.g. RDIAP 1982) and incidental pieces (Bakker 1985b, 1995a). Finally, now that I have accomplished other academic goals, I have the time to re-examine earlier ideas in light of extensive study of sociological theory, especially the work of Max Weber (1865-1920), whose ideas influenced my doctoral dissertation on *Patrimonialism and Imperialism as Factors in Underdevelopment* three decades ago (University of Toronto 1979). That dissertation focused on the cultivation system (Fasseur 1975, Van Niel 1992) and resulted in several publications (Bakker 1983, 1988). Despite Professor Willem F. Wertheim's stress on the Weberian patrimonialism thesis, few contemporary scholars have picked up on that ideal typic hypothesis. But I believe that there is still great value in applying the notion of patrimonial-prebendalism to both Buddhist-Hinduⁱⁱⁱ and Islamic principalities in the archipelago.^{iv}

The external examiner for my dissertation was Professor John R. W. Smail from the University of Wisconsin, Madison. He meticulously reviewed my draft and made thousands of specific suggestions, such as using the Dutch word "Preanger Regentschappen" and the English expression "Priangan [Priangen] Regencies" but not the mixed term "Preanger Regencies"! As a very carefully historian he did not let me get away with the kinds of little idiographic errors that most sociologists are willing to overlook. But he was largely willing to defer to my use of Max Weber's concept of "patrimonialism." That is, while he did not fully accept the heuristic value of Weber's ideal type model of patrimonialism, he also eventually accepted that aspect of my dissertation as a reasonable conjecture.

That was due to the fact, in part, that the idea of using Weber's concept had come primarily from Professor Wertheim (1961, 1965). I will never forget the conversation I had with Willem Wertheim in 1977 in Wageningen, when he suggested that the massive amount of archival data I had collected in Jakarta and The Hague could perhaps allow me to develop the argument for the nineteenth century about the relevance of patrimonialism that had been made by J. C. van Leur for the seventeenth century (Wertheim 1954, Leur 1967). But now, with thirty years of hindsight, I believe I may have over-estimated the importance of Buddhist, Hindu and Hindu-Buddhist ideas concerning political economy and under-estimated the influence of Islam (Voll 1994, Yegar 1979, Turner 1974, Wheatley 1983, Woodward 1989, Siegel 1979, Riddell 2001). Nevertheless, an intense conversation with Professor A. H. Johns (1961, 1981, 1987) at the Australian National University in Canberra did provide the seed for a fuller recognition of the dialectical influence of Sufism, as well as both Shiite and Sunni Islam. It is in that context that I will try to very succinctly say a few words about "resistance," with the caveat that I am all too aware the topic requires a much longer and more careful discussion before it would even begin to satisfy Smail, Wertheim or Johns!

Please note that it would be impossible to summarize the complex literature on Aceh, Bali and Buton in three thick volumes, one for each case, much less one brief chapter. Moreover, the archipelago has many, many other specific cases that are not even mentioned (e.g. the Padri War). Hence, suggested readings are listed below.

II. Resistance: Marxist and Neo-Marxian versus Neo-Weberian Approaches:

The question of “resistance” to external influences pre-supposes a unified internal “civilization” (Eisenstadt 2007) of some sort. But before Muslim traders – many of them Sufis – brought a version of Islam to the northwestern parts of the archipelago (e.g. Aceh), starting in the thirteenth century, or even earlier, the archipelago was a rich tapestry of many different indigenous collectivities. In fact, it is anachronistic to speak of anything called “Indonesia” until the declaration of independence (*merdeka*) on August 17, 1945. Moreover, whatever unity there is in the diversity of the many island cultures today was largely a product of the early part of the twentieth century and World War II. The modern nation-state of Indonesia is based on secular principles.

The term “secular” can have several different and contradictory meanings. The semantic elusiveness of the term has led to many disputes about the true meaning of the five basic principles of the Indonesian state originally enunciated by Sukarno (*Pancasila*). These five principles evoke the five principles of Hinayana Buddhism and the Five Pillars of Islam, but also the mixture of indigenous animism and the eighth-century esoteric Vairochana cult of Mahayana Buddhism. It is probably the case that both Sukarno and Suharto thought of the core of religion in terms of the indigenous religion of Central Java, *agama Jawa* (See Sievers 1974: 7-10). Like arguments concerning the American Constitution, there is continued dialogue about the precise meaning of all five principles. A clear implication seems to be that Indonesia is not an exclusively Muslim state and that the “world religions” which recognize “one God” are all equal. Note that for Suharto that one God was a mystical “Godhead” as is found in *agama Jawa*. That recognition of tolerance of widely different religions leads to state secularism, but such a secular principle is counter to the notion of an “Islamic” state. Indonesia today is not an Islamic state, despite the large Muslim population.^v

Historians and social scientists take somewhat different approaches to “resistance” depending on theoretical orientation. In this chapter I will take a Neo-Weberian comparative-historical approach (Collins 1986, Wolf 1982, 1999, 2001, Eisenstadt 1998, Bakker 2007b) rather than a Neo-Marxist approach (Godelier 1965, Brewer 1980, Turner 1984) and emphasize *variations* in resistance.^{vi} The idea of resistance is treated by many Indonesian scholars from a primarily Islamic point of view, with opposition framed in terms of struggles against the colonial power associated with infidel Christians. But that idea has led to recent tragedies, like the thousands of deaths which resulted in part from the military actions of the federal government against the Free Aceh Movement. An Islamic resistance to Suharto’s rule and a secular nation-state was proclaimed by Teungku Hasan Muhammad di Tiro in October 1976. That was an echo of the previous Islamic resistance in Aceh that was led by Teungku Haji Cik di Toro against the N.E.I.’s government between 1881-1891. Cik di Toro is considered a national hero, but the Suharto government did not accept the notion that Muhammad di Tiro against the federal government was a continuation of the colonial-era struggles against the N.E.I. colonial state and the V.O.C., the *kumpeni* (Taylor 2003: 364-370).

The term resistance is treated here as a kind of *variable*, along an ordinal scale, from staunch **resistance** (Aceh at the end of the nineteenth century, and three principalities in Bali, 1906-1908) to relative **acceptance** (six principalities in Bali and the Buton Sultanate). There are probably few cases of “staunch acceptance” of what is perceived as

foreign domination, but in situations where small states accept the legitimate authority of a relatively somewhat more benign colonial power, rather than what is perceived as the domination of an existing foreign power, we can speak of a degree of acceptance. Moreover, we must also consider the broader issue of the gradual acceptance of Islam, which, after all, is also a force from outside.

The acceptance of Islamic theology by Muslim societies like Ternate, Buton, Makassar and Melaka could be considered an example of acceptance that is more than just superficial or convenient (Sandhu and Wheatley 1983). While Muslim trade routes may have existed as early as the ninth century, it was not until the fourteenth, fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that a string of small Muslim states existed in the archipelago (Riddell 2001, Taylor 2003: 60-87). Islam was gradually assimilated, yet it must be admitted that Islamic beliefs originating in the Arab peninsula are foreign to the archipelago. It was colonization, but not nineteenth century imperialism. The “axial age” Islamic Civilization (Eisenstadt 1986) that came to the archipelago we now know as Indonesia is not usually considered an imperialistic colonial influence, but it was definitely a “foreign” import and it also evoked various kinds of resistance. The political economy of Islamic expansion is usually considered to have little to do with modern capitalism, even though it is definitely an aspect of generic, pre-modern “capitalism.” In fact, some scholars even consider Islam the direct opposite to “Western” modernity (Huntington 1997: 209-218). That “conservative” idea does not necessarily run counter to Marxism, but it is not explained by extreme versions of the Marxist-Leninist thesis concerning imperialism as one of the later stages of modern monopoly capitalism.^{vii} Acceptance did take place, and not always under duress. But that does not fit the popular stereotype of outsider influence. It is also an idea that may lead some to think that I am not facing the historical facts squarely.

But, I believe we must avoid the bias found in much Neo-Marxian inspired work and not simply consider the people who lived in the archipelago merely as “victims” of evil “imperialism” (Wilson 1940: 447-448; Toscano 2007). The Marxist lens is useful in calling attention to the very real aspects of exploitation that definitely were present (Wolf 1982). But it is not simply a matter of active imperialists and passive victims. There are various forms of colonization, and imperialism is not always at the heart of colonial power. As Max Weber points out in his essay on “Objectivity” (Weber 1958) to some extent a term like “imperialism” or “colonialism” is always a kind of idealized model, neither the actual nomothetic reality in itself nor merely an empty or useless ivory tower construct. The “ideal type” model helps the historian to ask the right questions. A balanced account requires an awareness of subtle and not so subtle differences among various language-based ethnic groups. What happened in Central Java in the nineteenth century (Kartodirdjo 1973) does not necessarily correspond to what happened on Ambon at the same time, or later (Benda-Beckmann 1988b). For most of the colonial era the Bajo (Bajau-Sama “sea gypsies”) were more directly affected by indigenous slave traders and pirates than by any European groups. Any attempt to get at “the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth” must include the various internal rivalries. It is not simply a matter of external “imperialism” and internal “patrimonialism,” as the title of my dissertation tends to imply. The Indonesian archipelago is a very complex tapestry and thousands of stories – most of them as yet untold – run simultaneously. It is only in introductory textbooks that it all fits into one neat pattern of exploiters and resisters.

One cannot understand the Butonese, for example, without some understanding of how they were exploited by Ternate, Makassar and the Islamic Buginese, some of whom had a role as mercenaries (Ricklefs 2001: 10, 67, Taylor 2003: 94, 107, 184-186). The Europeans (including the Portuguese, English and Dutch) were often exploiters and foes, but they were also frequently operating on the fringe and regarded as allies, or not taken note of very much at all (e.g. Ricklefs 1978: 169-201, Taylor 2003). Similarly, it is somewhat Euro-centric to over-emphasize the impact of the Europeans (particularly the Portuguese, English and Dutch) and de-emphasize the significance of the Chinese, Arab and Indian presence. The Arab and Indian Islamic presence is particularly important, but it is inter-dependent with the presence of Chinese traders and merchants. The story is much more complicated than a kind of development of underdevelopment. In that respect Geertz's (1970 [1963]) famous "involution" thesis concerning parts of Java does not do full justice to what was happening in all parts of Java, much less the rest of the archipelago. There would not have been involution on most parts of islands like Sulawesi.

III. Ideal Type Models: The "Dutch" and the "Indonesians":

In different parts of Sulawesi (the Celebes) the presence of European "Dutchmen" was minimal in terms of agriculture (as opposed to coastal trade) until the twentieth century. Indeed, as a percentage of the whole there were relatively few European "Dutchmen" anywhere in the archipelago, relative to the various indigenous and Chinese, Arab and Indian populations, until the twentieth century.

For example, in the nineteenth century many of those now discussed simply as "Dutch" were descendants of children born in the archipelago to European fathers and indigenous or Chinese mothers.^{viii} In other circumstances they might well have been considered simply "Indonesian." We need to be careful to avoid over-generalizing about "Dutch colonialism," as if it were all of one piece. During three hundred and forty years (between 1602 and 1942) the Dutch presence in the archipelago varied a great deal. It is not a matter of one monolithic Dutch imperial system. Nor are we discussing massive migration and settlement of people born in Europe. Indeed, the Netherlands itself changed a great deal during those three and a half centuries, from Republic to Kingdom. A key watershed is, of course, the bankruptcy and dissolution of the Dutch East Indies Company (V.O.C.) in 1792-1800, and the Napoleonic inter-regnum in Europe, with the British inter-regnum in Java (1811-1815).

Terms like "Dutch" and "Indonesian" are epistemologically-speaking "ideal types" and do not conform to a concrete, unchanging set of "real types." Those Europeans who worked for the V.O.C. in the early stages were often not people born in the Netherlands, or even Europe. Many "Dutch" soldiers in the K.N.I.L. at the time of the Aceh War were actually "Indonesians" from Minahassa or the Molukkas, some of whom were Protestants or Roman Catholics. The early struggles and the struggles after the declaration of August 17, 1945, are complex and they certainly do not indicate a simple picture of unification and unproblematic "Indonesian" national identity. Criticisms of the Suharto era include what some see as too heavy an emphasis on national unity at the expense of regional and local freedoms and political rights (Taylor 2003: 340-385, Ricklefs 2001: 193-421).

After the mid-nineteenth century the Netherlands East Indies government became more and more of an imperial state and a true N.E.I. started around 1906-08 (Bakker 1993). There was certainly staunch resistance to intrusion in some parts of the Indonesian archipelago. Outside interference meant changes in relatively long-term “traditional” rulership, but in some respects European “rational legal” modern capitalism was preferable to pre-modern forms of “domination” and legitimate authority (*Herrschaft*). As Weber (1968) explains in extensive detail, in general the rise of modern capitalism requires rational legal bureaucratic administration rather than patrimonial-feudal or patrimonial-prebendal traditional bureaucracies (Weber 1958, Bakker 1987).

Also, in the social sciences – the “uncertain sciences” (Mazlish 2007) – there is more concern with comparative generalizations, while idiographic historians (like John Smail) prefer detailed summaries of specific events.^{ix} Professor Sartono Kartodirdjo, the sociological historian who has contributed more to the study of resistance and rebellion in Java than any other author (Kartodirdjo 1966, 1973), is one of the few who has been able to combine *both* historical depth *and* sociological breadth. Rather than try to summarize Professor Kartodirdjo’s lasting contribution here (see Kartodirdjo 1972) I will examine three cases outside of Java: Aceh, Bali and Buton.

The three cases are quite different. If one studies only one case then one gets a different impression of resistance than if all three are considered simultaneously. The basic argument is that the three cases represent a range of reactions. The story of Bali is widely reported, but not always with a great deal of respect for the facts. Aceh has become widely known since the tsunami that hit Southeast and South Asia on December 26th, 2004. The small “kingdom” of Buton (which included Buton island and Muna island) is not well known to most Indonesians, much less Indonesianists, but it provides an important and neglected example.^x The complete history of Buton remains to be written, but we do have one excellent source (Schoorl 1987), and enough is known about the Butonese, and their rivals in Ternate, Makassar, and the diaspora Buginese, to present a few tentative idealized generalizations. The main point about Buton is that to a large extent the Butonese actually benefited from Dutch colonialism. Although Buton was an Islamic Sultanate, the reaction to Dutch indirect rule was quite different in Buton than in Aceh. Hence, one can speculate, on the basis of available documents, that the rulers and the people largely accepted Dutch indirect rule as a relatively progressive development, all things considered. They do not so much constitute a case of resistance as an example of acceptance of Dutch power as a relatively beneficial counter-influence in an isolated area and a very complex situation.

IV. Resistance to European Imperialism and Colonialism:

The study of resistance to empire is difficult. The whole idea of empire itself is very broad (Innis 2007, Mommsen 1980). The term evokes, for example, the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman Empire, both of which precede modern capitalism. Even if we ignore pre-modern empires that existed before modern capitalism and only consider the last five centuries or so (Kennedy 1987) the tendency is to think in very broad terms indeed. There are ideological interpretations that tend to stress the Marxist-Leninist notion that imperialism is by definition evil (Wilson 1940: 383, 447-448) and that any form of indigenous rule is better than outside intervention. Often the historical record is

distorted by nationalist rhetoric that served a useful purpose during periods of political struggle, as in the 1930s and 1950s. But what nationalist leaders like Sukarno said in emotionally-charged speeches, often on the basis of generalizations that were in part informed by conflicting adaptations of vaguely Marxist and Leninist ideas (Brewer 1980), should not be taken as historically accurate. We do not have to accept the strict version of the notion put forward by Leopold von Ranke that we can write history as it actually was (*wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*) in order to nevertheless be aware that the actual history is often far more complex than the narrative representation found in tourist museums like the one in Klungkung, Bali.^{xi} Dutch colonialism in Indonesia was not simply a matter of bad Europeans exploiting good Indonesians. For most of “Indonesian” history there simply were no “Indonesians,” only Butonese, Balinese, Javanese, Acehnese, and so forth.^{xii} For the most part, except in isolated circles, the idea of a “Pan-Indonesian identity” did not develop until the twentieth century. The conflict with Malaysia and the more recent events in Timor (East Timor) indicate that the precise contours of Indonesian identity are still not completely settled. Today there is still a degree of conflict concerning the Indonesian federal government’s role in Aceh (Martinkus 2004, Davies 2006, Drexler 2008), and in Irian Jaya.

Hence, paradoxically, one aspect of Dutch colonialism in the archipelago that definitely had a positive impact on the Republic of Indonesia is the creation of a political entity that spans a large part of the archipelago and is not just rooted in a small part of Central Sumatra or Central Java. Despite the claims of the Majapahit rulers that they had already unified the whole archipelago in the fifteenth century, it is actually only during the 1920s and 1930s that it is reasonable to speak of a relatively unified political entity. The modern nation-state of Indonesia would not exist in its present form as the fifth largest country in the world had it not been for the Dutch colonial presence. Sukarno himself was well aware of that, but he de-emphasized it in his efforts to achieve political independence (*merdeka*), which he proclaimed on August 17, 1945, immediately after the Japanese surrender during World War II. Like every other nation-state in the world today, the history of Indonesia is far more complex than most tourist guidebooks and high school history texts would have us believe.

An interesting contrast in resistance to empire can be gathered by examining three cases. Those cases provide a more variegated picture than that found in many Marxist accounts of imperialism. In Buton the relatively low level of political and economic development meant that there was relatively little resistance, especially since the Butonese and Munanese of Southeast Sulawesi stood to gain power relative to the Buginese in South Sulawesi (Celebes). But in Bali some local princes resisted by leading the mass suicide (*puputan*) of hundreds of followers, while others accepted the N.E. I. Take-over as a *fait accompli*. None of the resistance struggles in Bali were comparable in strength and effectiveness to the struggles by Islamic groups in Aceh, Northern Sumatra. The narrative must include a range of responses to indirect and direct rule by leaders and peasants, from hard-fought military resistance and militarily ineffective symbolic resistance, on the one hand, to reluctant and even grateful acceptance, on the other. There is quite a contrast between the extremes of the resistance of the Acehnese military guerillas and the acceptance of the Munanese and Bajo former slaves.

The story of resistance to colonialism in Indonesia is much more complicated than the political rhetoric of the independence struggle of the 1930s would lead one to believe. It

is not simply a matter of three hundred years of Dutch rule. Dutch rule was significant throughout the whole archipelago only after the first decade of the twentieth century. From 1906 to 1942, a period of about three decades, the Indonesia we think of today started to take shape. But before 1906 the archipelago was divided into many political entities. We often lose track of the diversity of the archipelago when we read about the Dutch presence in the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in certain relatively restricted geographical areas like the Spice Islands and parts of Java. Few popular authors make careful distinctions among the various phases of social change. During the period of its existence, for over a hundred years (1815-1942), the Netherlands East Indies was a shifting reality.

There was not simply one solid structure. Indeed, it was only after the Aceh War that we can speak of the N.E.I. as having power in most of the Indonesian archipelago. The N.E.I. was preceded by the V.O.C. period, which ended with bankruptcy in 1795. The Dutch Republic was taken over by the Napoleonic regime, with Napoleon's brother installed as King. During much of the Napoleonic Wars the British ruled in Java, from 1811-1815. After the Napoleonic Wars the Dutch Republic was reconstituted as a Kingdom in 1815, but Belgium became a separate nation-state in 1830. Dutch colonialism expanded in Java in the 1830s, the period of the cultivation system (*kultuurstelsel*). But the island of Bali remained completely independent until 1857, when the northern part of Bali was taken over. The southern part of Bali did not come under N.E.I. political control until after 1906.

V. Balinese *Puputan* and Acceptance:

One of the most poignant forms of resistance to Dutch colonialism was the dramatic confrontation between K.N.I.L. troops and some of the Balinese groups in the South in 1906 and 1908. The ritual mass suicide (*puputan*) is represented by the nationalist narrative as *the* characteristic form of Balinese resistance. But the island of Bali was not a unified territorial entity. After the demise of the Gelgel "kingdom" in the seventeenth century Bali was characterized by a complex collection of small, quasi-independent "princedom" (*ke-raja-an*) like Karangasem, Gianyar, Bangli, Buleleng, Jembrana, Tabanan, Badung and Klungkung. There was no unitary government after the mid-seventeenth century, if indeed there ever had been one. (One can question the extent to which Gelgel ever really was a true kingdom in the European sense.)^{xiii} Nevertheless there are two cases of dramatic *puputan* by several hundred followers of the raja of Badung of 1906 and of the raja of Klungkung of 1908. Those symbolic forms of ritual resistance cost the lives of hundreds of men, women and children. Nevertheless, while the *puputan* is sometimes taken as the characteristic response to Dutch imperialism, that is not the whole truth. The heroic confrontations should certainly not be slighted, since they can be viewed as reflecting a deep loyalty to traditional ways of life in the face of superior military force from outside. But it is not the case that every small princedom resorted to mass suicide when confronted by N.E.I. armed force. In 1906 in Tabanan, the raja and his son committed suicide, but there was no *puputan* comparable to those that took place in Badung and Klungkung. Moreover, Buleleng and Jembrana had been defeated in 1849, after heroic struggles in 1846 and 1848. They came under more direct forms of rule in 1882. Karangasem, Gianyar and Bangli came under indirect rule (in

1896, 1901 and 1909, respectively) but came under more direct forms of rule relatively peacefully (in 1921, 1917 and 1917). In other words, a full narrative account of events from 1846 to 1921 indicates a variety of different forms of incorporation into more direct forms of rule under the banner of the N.E.I. colonial government. “Bangli, Gianyar and Karangasem – came under Dutch authority without military resistance around the turn of the century” (Robinson 1995: 24-27).^{xiv}

VI. Aceh and Muslim Resistance:

To fully grasp resistance in the Aceh area it is important to examine aspects of Muslim societies and Islamic beliefs. The study of Islamic Muslim societies (Lapidus 1988) is complex and requires an awareness of many subtleties that can easily be overlooked. In some ways many Islamic theological and socio-political legal ideas are closer to the pre-Renaissance and pre-Reformation Worldview that Kugel (1998: 14-19, 889-898) lays out with respect to very early interpreters of the Talmud and Pentateuch.^{xv} Allam (2007) points out that interpretation of *Qur'an* (Koran) requires careful attention to semantic (and pragmatic) linguistic clarity. The Qur'an is Allah's word and hence has divine provenance. Since it is divinely inspired and sanctioned the oral message is a revelation. Caliph Utman (d 656) decided to follow the more conservative Basora school of Arabic grammar and his scholars codified the definitive Sunni version of the written text, which could not change after the death of Muhammad, the messenger and charismatic perfect man. “For the Shiites, on the contrary, the cycle of prophecy does not end, but continues throughout history” (Allam 2007: 2425). The prophetic tradition is kept alive through the succession of *imams*. For Sunnis the death of Muhammad in 632 C.E. ends revelation and *theology* is based on timeless, fixed dogma, but legal *juridical* interpretation continues. Hence, the study of Muslim societies (Gellner 1981, Geertz 1968, Lapidus 1988) requires careful differentiation of Sunni and Shiite faiths. The Southeast Asian context softened some of the more rigid aspects of Islamic dogma (Murphey 1996: 98-100). The mystical and non-denominational version of Islam, Sufism, which was a kind of mixture of Middle Eastern Islam and the mysticism of the India sub-continent, was especially important in Indonesia.

Due in part to its geographical location along major trade routes that go all the way to the Middle East, Aceh experienced a degree of Islamization very early, probably in the thirteenth century. Around 1515 Banda Aceh, the port, had an Islamic ruler, Sultan Ali Muhayat Syah, and “Aceh Dar us-Salam” controlled the river mouth. Public life centered around the Great Mosque, Bait ur-Rahman, built in 1614 by Sultan Iskandar Muda (Taylor 2003: 66, 74, 210-214).

In my chapter (Bakker 1994) on the Aceh War I have tried to summarize some basic aspects of the war (1873-1913). The Netherlands had no real claim to Aceh, but the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra between the Netherlands and Great Britain cleared the way for military action. The war was provoked by the Netherlands East Indies government when officials refused to negotiate with responsible Acehnese leaders in Banda Aceh. In an action reminiscent of the declaration by President George W. Bush that the mission was “accomplished” in Iraq, the Dutch declared the war over in 1881, but that was really just the middle of the first phase of the war. The military course of the war is summarized in English by Schulten (1988). Schulten argues that the war had three phases: 1873-93,

1894-1903, 1904-13. It is interesting to note that Anthony Reid (1969) ends his major study of the history of the region with a chapter on “The End of the Atjehnese Nation, 1885-1898.” Pepper exports declined and Aceh lost its place as the world’s leading exporter of pepper. In 1902-05 the Calvinist-inspired, neo-conservative government of the Netherlands (the “Anti-Revolutionary Party” of Prime Minister Abraham Kuypers) rewarded the proponents of aggressive military action (the “Atjeh School”) with key posts throughout the archipelago. Many precedents were set. For example, civil and military government were considered to be held jointly, an important precedent for the Republic of Indonesia’s concept of “two functions” (*dwi-fungsi*), military and civil. I have commented on several key personalities of that struggle, especially General J. B. (Johannes Benedictus) van Heutsz, Daud Beureueh, Teungku Cik Di Toro, and Professor Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje.

Let me re-emphasize here the role of Teungku Cik Di Toro (1836-1891), of the Tiro family. The ulamas from Tiro were said to have originated with a Javanese haji who settled in Pidie. Tiro became a center of Islamic learning. Toro and his four sons led six thousand men in a holy war (*jihad, perang sabil*) against the colonial government (known as the *kuempeni*, even though the V.O.C. had ceased almost a hundred years earlier). He sent letters to the *uleebelangs* to encourage them to fight for Allah against the infidel. Two of his sons died in fierce hand-to-hand fighting in 1896 and a grandson died in battle in 1911. Family ties reinforced Islamic faith. In a situation that is repeated in many places in the world today, there was little if any recognition by the “Europeans” (the N.E.I. government or the European officers of the K.N.I.L.) of the legitimacy of the moral outrage of the local (in this case Acehnese) jihadi guerillas.

The Shiite Islamic notion of power emanating from a charismatic *imam* (Geertz 1976: 76, Hodgson 1974) was very important in Aceh and may have been more important than the Sunni concept of the source of legitimate authority stemming from a sacred community (the *umma*). This had an impact long after the Aceh War. For example, James Siegel (1969) describes the *ulama* Daud Beureueh’s role in Aceh in the 1940s and 1950s. He was a rival of the *uleebelang* Teuku Keumangan Oemar. Daud Beureueh led the Acehnese rebellion against the Republican government centered in Java and South Sumatra. Ultimately the Republican government supported a largely “secular” notion of the European style nation-state, and Sukarno’s conceptualization of the five basic principles (*Pancasila*) can be viewed as a rejection of Islamic political ideas. The Javanese-dominated government of the Republic of Indonesia is not Islamic.

The Acehnese are not closely related to the Javanese; they looked to Arabia for precedents. Their language is related to the language spoken by the Cham (from ancient Champa in South Vietnam). Language, of course, is a key to identity (Bakker 2007a). Berg (1991), for example, has studied the various languages of Buton and Muna, like Wolio and Muna (Berg 1989), including the little known Cia-Cia language spoken by only 60,000 or so people. Despite its clear relevance to Java (Woodward 1989, Ricklefs 2001, Riddell 2001), Islam has been more *centrally important* in Aceh than it has been in Java. In Java the Buddhist and Hindu background was such that layers of Islamic influence were to some degree ameliorated and a significant portion of the population was not Muslim, or only nominally Muslim (Geertz 1960). The same can probably be said, albeit for different reasons, for the Buton Sultanate.

VII. The Buton Sultanate:

One of the few general histories of Indonesia to even mention Buton is by Jean Taylor (2003), who is a student of the eminent Indonesian historian John R. W. Smail. Smail himself wrote about the importance of attempting to formulate an “autonomous history” of Southeast Asia (Steinberg et al. 1987 [1971]). Taylor summarizes aspects of the history of Indonesia. She does so through a series of different “lenses.” Her first chapter examines early beginnings “through material culture.” Her study of “kingdoms” examines events “through writing and temples.” When she examines how “Europeans enter Indonesian histories” (in Chapter 5) she relies on stories and chronicles written by indigenous members of the archipelago as well as “Chinese” traders and settlers. She attempts as much as possible to provide what she calls “an Indonesian-centered account.” Like many contemporary historians, she attempts to escape the constricting influences of a European-centered account where indigenous people “fade into the background as observers, victims, or converts” (Taylor 2003: 137). In other words, she tries to avoid the dilemma so cogently emphasized by Eric Wolf (1982) in his famous book *Europe and the People Without History*. If we wish to avoid a “Euro-centric” narrative then we must pay particular attention to the historical materials that are locally based, as in Ricklefs’ careful study (1978a) of a Javanese chronicle and in Sjamsuddin’s (1991) study of Kalimantan. We must, whenever possible, let indigenous people speak for themselves (Sapir 1949). When it comes to the Butonese and Munanese the idea of a “people without history” is exemplified in spades. Very few people have ever heard of Muna Island, where I did field work, and the Buton (Butung) Sultanate does not merit much more than a footnote in most standard works on Indonesian history (Ricklefs 1981, Taylor 2003: 66, 102).

To some extent Taylor (2003: 60-87) examines “sultanates” and sultans “through Islam” (i.e. through Islamic writing). But as a product of modern European scholarship she shares assumptions first formulated during the Renaissance that seem like “common sense” to many people in the West but which contrast greatly with the traditional assumptions of almost all ancient and medieval Jewish, Christian and Islamic interpreters. For example, we tend to assume that (1.) “X means X” rather than “X *really* means Y” and that (2.) historical records (in the Bible and Qur’an) are essentially a record of things that once happened and not detailed instructions for what is happening today (Kugel 1998: 1-41, esp. 15-16). So it is hardly the case in any precise sense that Taylor is writing the history of the Islamic petty states (like Ternate, Demak, Tuban, Gresik, Cirebon, Gorontalo, Luwu, Taoo’, Gowa and Bima) from a Sunni or even a Shiite perspective. The “hidden” esoteric meanings of the Qur’an are not considered by modern historians, like Smail and Taylor (or Fairbank and Murphey), to apply directly to specific events in the archipelago in the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth or nineteenth centuries! For example, the eruption at Krakatau (Thornton 1996) is not considered by modern historians to have been anticipated by Allah in his words to Mohammad in 632 C.E.

VIII. Future Research, Recapitulation and Conclusion:

As stated, in this chapter I have briefly discussed examples from Bali, Aceh and Buton. It would require at least three lengthy books to even begin to do those cases justice – much less begin to review in even a preliminary manner all of the possibly

relevant cases –hence I have supplied a list of recommended, suggested readings. It is a long list, but far too short to satisfy most experts.

Those three places are complex in many ways and a complete “anthropological” discussion (Sapir 1949) has not been possible. Also, I did not attempt to summarize the abundant literature about Java (Woodward 1989). Inevitably, there must also be *some* mention of Java, but I did not attempt to summarize the Javanese case. Facile generalizations about Java have too often led to even more misleading generalizations about Indonesia as a whole. Indeed, my own work was somewhat Java-centric in terms of what Taylor (2003: 340-385) calls “Majapahit Visions.”

One place to begin to learn about resistance in Java, as mentioned, is the excellent work by Sartono Kartodirdjo (1966, 1972, 1973). It is also important to consider the Java War of 1825-1830, of course (Bayly 1986).^{xvi} To some extent, in a lengthier discussion it would be necessary to mention the impact of Javanese Buddhist-Hindu civilization on Bali, as for example in the Javanese calendar (Ricklefs 1978b) and its impact on the Balinese calendar, offerings and rituals like *odalan* and *Eka Dasa Rudra* (Eiseman 1990: 172-278). The history of the gradual N.E.I. sponsored Muslim expansion into formerly Balinese-controlled East Java (as opposed to Central Java) is also a fascinating, under-reported aspect of the struggle between the N.E.I. and Bali. But it is difficult enough to summarize the three cases: Bali, Aceh, and Buton (Ricklefs 2001).

The case of Aceh fills lengthy books (e.g. Siegel 1969, Reid 1969) and resistance in Bali has been widely reported, although the true nature of traditional Balinese rulership is the subject of dispute (Geertz 1970). The least discussed case is the Buton Sultanate. Some work has been done (Schoorl 1987) and that case deserves to be better known, particularly in lights of its theoretical importance as a counter to simplistic arguments about resistance.

To fully understand the post-colonial situation in the Republic of Indonesia we need to move beyond stereotypes concerning a uniform structure of domination. I myself have been guilty to some extent of over-emphasizing the central role of the Javanese court culture. While it may be true that the patrimonialism (Weber 1968) of the Central Javanese kratons is an important part of the story, particularly for Java and Bali, it is nevertheless also true that the importance of Islamic theories of *'asabiyya* should be given careful consideration. Just as the study of modern “terrorism” requires study of peer group influences (Bakker 2007b), the study of “resistance” challenges us to have a better grasp of the complexities of Southeast Asian adaptations of Islam, particularly Sufism (Noer 1973). More work needs to be done comparing the various Islamic states. We need to examine their own internal relationships, as well as their ties to India and the Middle East. There are several detailed studies, but there does not seem to be one comprehensive examination of the importance of various forms of Islam for Muslim societies throughout the archipelago (Johns 1981, 1987, Hooker 1983). Detailed overviews, like Pelras’s (1996) study of the Bugis (Buginese), requires a great deal of work and a variety of historical, linguistic and ethnographic skills.

When I visited Ceribon in 1976 it was surprising how important the *ziarah* veneration of the graves (“tombs”) of Islamic holy men (*wali*) like Sunan Gunung Jati (i.e. perhaps *She Lěmahbang*) still was (Fox 1991). At that time I did not know enough about the Javanese calendar to fully understand, but friends had told me an important ceremony was going to be happening. Thousands of people crowded into a small space in

celebration of a man who had brought Islam to Sunda's Pajajaran and is considered by some to be an exemplar of the Islamic concept of a perfect man (*Rasulullah*, the *al-Insan al-Kamil*). Indeed, the "saints" of Java are still important throughout Java (Drewes 1968, 1996, Rinkes 1910-1913, 1996). A major procession featured the rulers of Ceribon in such a way that for an instant I felt like I was back in the seventeenth century, or even earlier. Ceribon is geographically close to Jakarta and Bandung, but it is culturally much closer to the coastal pasisir states of an earlier era. It is a vestige of a time which has largely been lost to modern (and postmodern) life in the globalized, urban Java of the twenty-first century. The excellent work done by Johns (1966) and many others provides a beginning, but hopefully in the future Indonesian scholars will provide more detailed studies of the sociological history of the inter-relationship between European and non-European outside forces. Buton and Aceh were both Islamic, but their forms of resistance were quite different. Indonesia is far too complex a place to allow for generalizations that take global terms like "Christianity," "imperialism," "colonialism," and "Islam" at face value. If we reify the words we do an injustice to the realities.

One unexplored aspect of the relationship between Europeans and Indonesians is the outside influence of Middle Eastern and Indian Muslims. The form that Islamic thought took in Southeast Asia was different from the form it had taken in Saudi Arabia in the earliest stages of Islamic Civilization (Hooker 1983) and there are many questions that can be raised about the precise interpretation of the life of Muhammad (Watt 1962, 1965, Armstrong 1993) and the meaning of passages in the *Qur'an* (Koran). While some interpret the Qur'an in a more mystical fashion (Arberry 1996 [1955]), there is also critical exegesis inspired by the Historical School (Wellhausen 1899, 1902) and recent hermeneutical perspectives.

As a hypothesis it is safe to say that quite probably Islamic thought in the archipelago was not necessarily based on "What the Koran Really Says" (Warraq 2002). That is, scholarly exegesis was probably often not the key factor in acceptance of general Islamic ideas. Even today relatively few Indonesian Muslims actually know Arabic in a critical, scholarly way. Alternative accounts of the rise of Islam (Robinson 2003) were not considered by Acehnese *ulama* in the resistance movement. As Anthony Reid (1969: 81-84, 122-125, 136-137, 148-152, 289) points out, in the contest for Aceh (Atjeh) and other parts of North Sumatra, Pan-Islamic movements and notions of holy war (jihad) were quite important. But the counter-example of the Buton Sultanate makes it clear that Islamic thought did not always have precisely the same effect. Any study of resistance to European imperialism and colonialism will have to carefully consider not only earlier forms of rulership based on Buddhist-Hindu ideas but also the precise interpretations of Islamic thought that developed in various places in the archipelago.

The big picture question is, of course, the long term spread of "civilizations" (Eisenstadt 2007). The fierce resistance in Aceh at the turn of the century (c. 1890-1906), and the *puputan* in two *kerajaan* in Bali, was due in part to the "clash of civilizations," although perhaps not precisely in the sense meant by Huntington (1997: 174-179). As Huntington points out, after the demise of the Ottoman Empire Islam was left without an effective, well-recognized core state that is acknowledged by all Muslims. The tsunami which hit Aceh has made the clash between the nation-state principle (embodied in the Republic of Indonesia) and the Islamic religious loyalty (embodied in the concept of *ummah*) less significant. Today Indonesia has the largest Muslim population for any

nation-state in the world, but Indonesia is located on the periphery of Islam and is “far removed from its [former] Arab center; its Islam is of the relaxed, Southeast Asian variety; and its people and culture are a mixture of indigenous, Muslim, Hindu, [Buddhist], Chinese, and Christian influences” (Huntington 1997: 177). The continued importance of *Pancasila* for “secularism” – and the full recognition of the five “world religions” (Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, Roman Catholicism and Islam) in a European-style nation-state – guarantees that the Republic of Indonesia will not be considered the core Islamic state. In the future “resistance” in Indonesia will continue to be as much about resisting Islamic fundamentalism as it will be about resistance to other forms of external domination and control. The “post-colonial state” of secular Indonesia (Alatas 1997) is as much a beneficiary of European influences as it is a victim.

In this chapter I have not attempt to briefly provide a narrative of the mosaic. I have merely indicated some historical and sociological materials that would enter into such a narrative. An objective story would examine the great variety of resistances and acceptances at different times and places. Rather than stress one monolithic imperial power, as some Marxist or Islamic writers are wont to do, it is important to tell the story of variety and diversity. It was not all a matter of simple resistance. Indeed, in many phases of the expansion of V.O.C. trade and later Dutch N.E.I. governmental colonial power there was a great deal of cooperation. We can view what happened as a simple case of the imperial power following a strategy of divide and conquer, but that does not tell the whole story. There were groups in the archipelago which welcomed the outsiders for a host of different reasons. Moreover, the mystique of earlier conversions to various Buddhist-Hindu ideas and various forms of Islamic thought should not be used to set up a false picture of a homogeneous pre-colonial past or anti-colonial opposition. Perhaps somewhat ironically, the way in which Pancasila has been interpreted in recent decades may actually be heuristic for the social construction of the “imagined community” (Anderson 1983) of the Republic of Indonesia as a unitary, “secular” nation-state.

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Glossary:

Adat = customary law, (1.) as understood locally; but, (2.) also as perceived and systematized by Dutch legal scholars (see Josselin de Jong 1948).

'asabiyya = a term derived from the Bedouin *'asaba*, meaning to bind, fold or wind, it refers to a basic and irreducible inter-relationship among biological, geographical, cultural and social aspects of human collectivities reflecting socio-political solidarity, power and vitality. It is similar to a Durkheimian “social fact” concerning kin solidarity and communal descent and is used by Ibn Khaldun. The *'asâba* is the group of male relatives (Stauth 2008).

Babad ing Singkala = a 2,177 line, 253 stanza long Javanese verse epic chronology and history from Yogyakarta that was obtained by the British during the sack of the Yogyakarta court in 1812 and that covers the period 1478 to 1720 C.E. It is part of the Colin Mackenzie collection in the India Office Library, London, U.K. (Ricklefs 1978).

Bajo = “sea gypsies” of Southeast Asia, found in parts of Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma and elsewhere; also called the Bajau, Sama, Bajo-Sama, and other terms in different parts of Southeast Asia.

Buton = (1.) the geographical island of Buton; (2.) the geo-political area of pre-colonial and colonial *Wolio*, including both Buton and Muna islands.

Dakwah = an Arabic word that means efforts to improve thought and behavior; Mohammad Natsir formed the Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council in 1967 to counteract Indonesian Islam that emphasized mysticism and submission to a spiritual leader.

Hukum = law in general; formal institutional legal regulations

Imperialism = (1.) form of pre-modern, traditional, pre-capitalist societal organization in which one ethnic and/or linguistic group exploits other groups in such a way that the empire constitutes a loose form of legitimate authority, often centered on one emperor or sultan or Maharaja (see Patrimonialism); (2.) modern capitalist political and military structure in which the dominant group is a hegemonic modern capitalist nation-state, as in the notion of the “British Empire,” where the hegemonic power was Great Britain (i.e. England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland). (See Brewer 1980, Mommsen 1980, and summary by Toscano 2007).

Involution = (1.) term used by Clifford Geertz as a technical term to describe the complex pattern of land usage; (2.) term used by Alexander Goldenweiser primarily to describe artistic complexity, as for example during the Baroque and Rococo eras in Europe.

K.N.I.L. = *Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger* (Royal Dutch Indonesian Army).

Masyumi = an Islamic national political party that was dissolved by Sukarno in 1960, but that had been the second largest party in the elections of 1955, winning 21% of the vote.

Pancasila, Panca Sila, Pantja Sila = the five principles upon which the nation-state of Indonesia was founded: (1.) belief in a Godhead that is one (2.) nationalism (3.) humanity, internationalism (4.) democracy, and (5.) social justice.

Patrimonialism = (1.) term used by European, particularly German, French and Italian scholars in the nineteenth century to designate a form of government and administration in which the ruler is considered formally to be the owner of the country; the society is his “patrimony.” This can be characteristic of kingdoms or empires; (2.) specific usage by Max Weber in his *Economy and Society*, where it is argued that patrimonial-prebendalism oscillated with patrimonial-feudalism in traditional, large-scale pre-modern societies. (See Roth 1968)

Ulama = plural form of the Arabic *‘alim*, learned; religious teaches and scholars.

Uleëbalang = direct chief in Aceh (Atjeh, Atcheh)

V.O.C. = *Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie* (United East Indies Company).

Wolio = pre-colonial and colonial-era Buton and Muna islands considered as a unified geo-political entity

End Notes:

ⁱ See Bakker (1982). Albert Bakker’s reminiscences can be retrieved at my web page www.semioticsigns.com

ⁱⁱ In Islam, of course, the color of one’s skin is theologically supposed to be of no relevance. That is one reason many African-Americans became followers of Islam. They were fully accepted. Whether one has white or black or brown or yellow skin should not have a direct bearing on whether one is a good Muslim. When indigenous people from the archipelago went to Mecca for the haj they were accepted as Muslim brothers, despite their racially different appearance.

ⁱⁱⁱ While it is customary to write “Hindu-Buddhist” it is more reasonable to reverse the order since Buddhism preceded what we in the West call Hinduism today. See Collins (1998: 177-271). The earlier Vedic and Upanishadic religions changed significantly as they became intermingled with new ideas that came from Jain, Buddhist and other sources. During the period when Java was most heavily influenced by Indic models there was a great deal of inter-penetration of what we today call Hindu and Buddhist ideas. The religion of Bali (Eiseman 1990) is neither purely Hindu nor Buddhist.

^{iv} Weber’s concept of the “ideal type” involves a kind of tentative model that needs to be explored through detailed examination of historical materials. The fundamental idea of “patrimonialism” (Bakker 2007) involves an interpretation of pre-modern, “traditional” rulership. No historical case will ever conform one hundred percent to ideal type models. But historical study of topics like “Islam” or “Muslim Society” will always, according to Weber, involve a set of generalizations that are epistemologically far from “real.” In other words, we can never pin down the precise, concrete reality of any historical phenomenon and even “thick description” involves a certain degree of abstraction and “idealization” from available facts.

^v One very misleading aspect of journalistic accounts of Indonesia is the notion that Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the world. Indonesia, like Turkey and India, is a secular nation-state and is therefore fundamentally different from Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

^{vi} The Neo-Marxian and Neo-Weberian approaches do not need to be considered as fundamentally in opposition. Hence, we can regard Wolf (1980) as either Neo-Weberian or Neo-Marxian. But Wolf's work is not "Neo-Marxist" and certainly not "Marxist-Leninist" in the strict sense.

^{vii} Originally Lenin argued that imperialism is the last stage of capitalism, but a great deal has happened since Lenin put forward that argument. Contemporary Marxist critiques of "globalization" tend to move beyond the original Leninist argument, the kernel of which Lenin drew from Hobsbawm (Zeitlin 1972).

^{viii} Different colonies had different views concerning inter-marriage and the legitimacy of offspring with mixed racial heritage. In most settler colonies, there was a great deal of emphasis on the lower status of anyone with even a "drop" of indigenous "blood." This has changed somewhat in recent times and today many Americans claim to be part "Indian." In the history of colonies where white settlement was very strongly discouraged, like Indonesia, the European designation is sometimes retained by third, fourth and fifth generation people of mixed heritage. If one examines photographs of the nineteenth "Dutch" officers of the K.N.I.L. colonial army one sees very few stereotypically "Dutch" looking faces. Yet it is usually not recognized that those "Indonesians" were just as Indonesian (by modern standards) as indigenous people who had had less inter-racial mingling. The total number of people who came directly from the Netherlands to what we now call Indonesia was very small relative to the total population up until the very last stages of the Netherlands East Indies in the 1930s.

^{ix} Mazlish (2007: 83-128) emphasizes the importance of Interpretative approaches, which he dubs "hermeneutics," following Gadamer (1992 [1960]). There is a great deal of variety among different Interpretive hermeneutic approaches to socio-cultural, historical sciences. Mazlish considers both Marx and Weber as Interpretive rather than Positivistic. But many Marxists think of Marx's theories as strictly scientific. See Bakker (forthcoming) on "Interpretivism."

^x My involvement with Buton began in 1986 when I worked as a consultant for CIDA, the Canadian International Development Agency, on an integrated rural development project on Muna Island. I was able to have extensive discussions with several Butonese "aristocrats" and obtained photocopies of rare documents pertaining to the history of that little known political entity. I had further discussions with the district head (*bupati*) and relatives of the former raja when I made a second visit to the Province of Southeast Sulawesi in 1988 in order to study local migration by the Bajo (*Bajau-sama*) "sea gypsies" in one village on the southwest coast of Muna Island.

^{xi} The Klungkung museum has photocopies of Dutch-language newspapers which carried detailed accounts of the events of 1906-1907-1908 in Bali. I spent several hours intensively reading those accounts during a visit in June, 2006. The tragedy of the mass suicides, which was often reported in a respectful and shocked manner by reporters, was viewed by many as an unnecessary waste of life. Particularly sad was the death of children and young women who could not have had any clear idea of what was happening. The rajas of three traditional principalities refused to compromise, but in six other small states the rulers were able to find common ground. The average tourist did not pause very long in the room where the resistance of 1906 and 1908 was depicted and would probably have carried away a very black and white impression of events.

^{xii} The more than 13,677 islands, large and small, that make up the archipelago have many quite varied population groups and represent around nine hundred different languages. The use of Indonesian (Bahasa Indonesia) makes it somewhat easier to have national unity, but it will always be "unity in diversity" (*bhinneka tunggal ika*). The Republic of Indonesia is a secular nation-state.

^{xiii} The use of the word "kingdom" is metaphorical. A technically more precise word that would convey the political structure is Max Weber's term: patrimonialism. Indeed, I have argued that most of the so-called kingdoms of Bali and Java were essentially "patrimonial-prebendal" pre-feudal states (Bakker 1978). That is, the officials held "prebends" (like stipends) and were dependent on the legitimate authority of the patrimonial rulers, here called "rajas."

^{xiv} Robinson's excellent study of the violence of the 1965-66 massacres, where probably 80,000 people died due to political upheaval on Bali -- and approximately another 420,000 people died in the rest of Indonesia -- also provides a very useful summary of the complex events during the pre-colonial and colonial eras (Robinson 1995: 4 - 69). I have benefited from Robinson's convenient narrative, as well as Geertz (1980), and have not attempted here to summarize source material or the detailed Dutch literature (e.g. Bruyn Kops 1915) on which they both rely.

^{xv} I use the word Talmud to describe the first five books of the Hebrew Scriptures, the Tanakh, and the word Pentateuch to indicate the first five books of the Christian Old Testament. In subtle ways the nuances of interpretation of those two texts are quite different, even though the words are almost the same when properly transliterated and translated.

^{xvi} C. A. Bayly compares the Java War with the Indian Mutiny. Comparative work of that kind is very important for any generalizations about resistance to imperialism.