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EDITOR'S NOTE

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DATA GATHERING AND PROJECT DESIGN: A THIRD WORLD CASE STUDY OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

By J. I. (Hans) Bakker

ABSTRACT

There are many constraints to community development. In this paper some of the constraints to the design of a feasible integrated, rural community development project in an isolated third world setting are considered. Constraints to data gathering are considered in terms of reliability, validity, and multi-disciplinary team work. Constraints to the project design process are discussed with respect to attitudes of officials, the use of the report, and development. Three factors which community development specialists might want to pay particular attention to are: interpersonal relations, qualitative contextual factors and community goals. This case study will help to clarify some of the similarities and differences between Indonesia and other third world settings on the one hand and North America on the other. While social organization and welfare may be quite different in some respects, some of the constraints to data gathering and project design may be analogous to problems frequently encountered in community development efforts in the U.S. or Canada.

INTRODUCTION

The objective of this paper is to describe the process of information gathering in a third world developmental setting. There are many stages involved in community development efforts. The data gathering phase, however, has not been studied as much as other stages, particularly outside of North America. The case report material omit-

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ted here would be of interest to those who are specifically concerned with village-level development in Southeast Asia and in comparable parts of the world. Those who are not specifically interested in Indonesia may nevertheless be interested in this analysis as a "case study" of one aspect of the community development process.

The data are from the sociological part of a report written by four Canadian team members for the Canadian International Development Agency, C.I.D.A., the Canadian equivalent of U.S. A.I.D. The other Canadians on the team were experts in the fields of fisheries, agronomy and agricultural economics. The constraints to data gathering and development are presented because only by having a complete and detailed understanding of obstacles to data gathering is it possible to have a clear idea of specific development strategies and targets.

Indonesia

Indonesia is a nation-state which comprises 13,677 islands, 3,500 of which are inhabited. The archipelago stretches 3,210 miles from East to West, with a land area of 1.9 million square kilometers. The Indonesian archipelago is the largest in the world and forms a highway between the Pacific and Indian Oceans as well as a bridge between Asia and Australia. Indonesia's population is the fifth largest in the world. (The population of Indonesia was approximately 151.6 million in 1983.) With more than 80 million people living on Java and other "inner islands," there is a great deal of interest in resettling some of the people to the less densely populated "outer islands."¹ Such projects are known in Indonesia as "transmigration" schemes.

The combination of lopsided population distribution and regional disparities in economic development has led successive governments of Indonesia to actively promote the idea of moving poor people from more densely settled "inner islands" to less densely settled "outer islands." Transmigration schemes, however, are not likely to be able to handle a large proportion of the increase in population in the inner islands. Moreover, socio-economic conditions in the outer islands are

¹ In his classical analysis of the process of "agricultural involution in Indonesia," Geertz (1971, pp. 12-37) discusses the differences between the inner islands and the outer islands in terms of two types of "ecosystems": slash and burn (*ladang*) versus wet rice paddy fields (*sawah*). The *sawah* flooded paddy fields of Java and Bali are a key factor in the system of "shared poverty" that Geertz discusses. There is no paddy cultivation in the communities studied, yet there is a system of "shared poverty" very similar to that found on Java.

not necessarily conducive to greatly increased "pioneer settlement" by Javanese and Balinese migrants. The people living in the outer islands are dependent on an ecological and socio-economic way of life that has evolved over many generations. It cannot always be easily adapted to a changing, growing population.² Hence, birth control and family planning are an important component in the government's overall development strategy.

Sub-districts and Growth with Equity

In addition to transmigration and population control, economic growth has been a major component in Indonesia's national planning. A key theme involves the equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. In addition, the government has placed rural development at the "sub-district" level high on its list of priorities.³

Of the five administrative levels in Indonesia's governmental structure—national, provincial, district, sub-district and village-cluster—the sub-district level has been the least well integrated into national development efforts. The reasons for this are complex. The lack of adequate attention to the sub-district level is partially due to the different role played by the sub-district in the outer islands than in the inner islands. In the outer islands village-clusters often do not represent true communities in terms of linguistic, cultural or socio-economic structure in the way they do on the "inner islands." Reasons for this are grounded in the colonial heritage. The colonial government tended to emphasize the inner islands for a variety of reasons

² An estimated 42 percent of the population is under the age of sixteen. Indonesia as a whole has a high infant mortality rate, approximately 100 deaths before age one, out of every 1,000 recorded live births. Approximately one third of Indonesia's children suffer from malnutrition (Grant, 1984, pp. 13, 40). One major factor is lack of equitable distribution of money income. The income distribution is highly skewed between urban and rural areas (Zuidberg, 1968). Overall, the per capita income is approximately US (currency equivalent) \$530 per year, with a GNP of US \$66.8 billion (1982), mostly derived from oil and natural gas profits.

³ The Suharto-led government came to power in 1965 as a result of a complex series of political events analyzed by Crouch (1978). The army's important role in political life was justified ultimately by the government's promise of economic development and distribution of the benefits of development to a broader cross-section of the population. The government's economic policy was established with an eye to the reaction of the International Monetary Fund. In 1967, the United States, Japan, and other industrialized states formed the Inter-Governmental Group on Indonesia (IGGI) to coordinate aid policies and in following years aid inflows increased vastly. The IMF and the IGGI play a key role in influencing Indonesian development policies and five-year plans, according to Crouch (1978, p. 320).

(Bakker, 1978; Geertz, 1971). Thus, along with the general neglect of the outer islands during colonial times there was also a neglect of community structures characteristic of the sub-district in the outer islands. The national government has attempted to correct this imbalance since 1979. It is now recognized that community development efforts in the outer islands must be focused on the sub-district level. Sub-districts can also be important in the inner islands, but in the outer islands—where population density is relatively low—village-clusters are too small to provide the necessary initiative and basic administrative and management expertise for effective community development. Moreover, district officials are often not as fully aware of local conditions as sub-district officials. In the outer islands of Indonesia today the community is often best represented at the sub-district level; the sub-district is the community.⁴

The Case Study Area

The study team, in cooperation with Indonesian counterparts and from officials at the provincial and district levels of government, studied two sub-districts. The relatively isolated sub-districts lie a 1½-hour ferry ride across a narrow strait from a regional economic center for the coastal region.

The two sub-districts studied by the team were chosen on the basis of their classification in a national study conducted by the Ministry of Public Works as among those sub-districts which are the poorest and most in need of development assistance. They are officially called "critical communities" and represent 20 percent of the 3,329 sub-districts in Indonesia. Furthermore, they were also selected by an earlier Canadian study team that made an extensive examination of their development potential. That study (University of British Columbia, 1979) had included the case study sub-districts in its list of areas which required more intensive research and which would benefit from Canadian development assistance.

⁴ In this analysis the concept of community is linked to the sub-district (*kecamatan*) rather than the lower, village-cluster level (*desa*) or the administratively higher district level (*kabupaten*). Most of the peasants identify with their hamlet or village; however, it is unlikely that development efforts will reach villages except through the sub-district head's efforts. Most planning decisions basically are made by the national government, but decentralization is a stated goal. The key to decentralization is seen as the sub-district because sub-district officials are close enough to the grass roots to be reliably informed and yet distant enough to be, on average, reasonably well educated and well informed.

Constraints in the Data Gathering Process

There are many constraints in the data gathering process in a third world setting, especially when one works as a member of an interdisciplinary team. Let us consider constraints to obtaining adequate information and then examine constraints to working in a team.

Constraints to gathering unbiased data. In many community settings in developing nations it is difficult to obtain unbiased information (Dixon, 1980). Interviewer effect plays a part in determining response. Local people saw us as representatives of a foreign donor which might be willing to give them money. Therefore, they had every reason to promote their own communities' standards of living by encouraging more assistance funds. At times local conditions may have been made out to be more limited than they really were. It was not always clear that this biasing factor was operative because it may well have been cancelled out by the equal but opposite effect of the bias created by the desire of local officials to look good in the eyes of their superiors from the district and provincial levels of administration.

A more pronounced biasing factor involved the relationships between Canadian team members—considered as a group—and their Indonesian counterparts. It is clear that the interactions which took place did not always promote the collection of relevant, useful information (Chambers, 1983, p. 22). That is due in part to lack of a common language, both in terms of the split between *Bahasa Indonesia* and English and in terms of differences in professional and personal orientations. While language may not have been the key factor, all team members shared some development jargon in common, although it was often expressed in a strange mix of Indonesian and English words. (At times the team resorted to Dutch words like *medebewind*, an antiquated term used in colonial times to mean something like "governing together.") The key factor, however, may not have been verbal communication but the silent language of prestige and status differences.

Prestige differences between Canadians and Indonesians hindered the smooth running of the research.⁵ In addition, there were cultural differences which furthered the status differentials. For example, in

⁵ For example, Canadian team members were often housed in more expensive quarters than Indonesian counterparts, due to the vastly different incomes and per diems received. Even though the Indonesian counterparts were well paid, by their own standards, they were quite well aware of the wealth enjoyed by the Canadians. It was difficult to develop and maintain friendships when Indonesian counterparts were physically separated from those they were assigned to help.

Indonesia it is customary to visit someone in his home, even without an invitation, if you are working together. The head of the Indonesian counterpart team kept waiting for the head of the Canadian team to make a formal visit while the Canadian team leader kept waiting for an invitation. It was only after several weeks that the etiquette problem was solved by one of the younger Indonesian counterparts inviting the Canadian team over to his house for dinner. This seemingly trivial incident was extremely important. At dinner the Canadian team leader spoke with the Indonesian team leader informally for the first time. This served to improve working relations immensely.

The research report, however, was viewed by the Indonesians as a Canadian effort and not as a joint effort, even though the Canadians could not have done the work without the help and guidance of the Indonesian counterparts. The Indonesian team members, however, contributed greatly to the information we were able to gather, but they were reluctant to speak out. At district-level meetings, for example, they preferred to be silent. Because responsibility for the final report was not placed in the hands of the Indonesian team they may not have been as concerned with the final product as they otherwise might have been. On the other hand, the Canadian team's assumption of responsibility made it possible for them to be less concerned with criticisms they might receive from superiors and report things which might otherwise not have been reported, like problems with receiving adequate medical supplies for newly built first aid stations. Heavily influenced by the prestige differentials of a patron-client system and an efficient military, local officials were reluctant to make any pressing claims and tended not to report problems that could not be solved through intervention of higher levels of government anyway.

Thus far the discussion has shown the constraints to gathering unbiased, reliable information. If another foreign team were to go to the study area it is likely they would reach somewhat different conclusions regarding specific facts.

However, even if data are completely reliable, it does not necessarily mean they are valid. While the team was able to escape many sources of bias, we were still not always sure that the information obtained would be the most useful information for planning purposes. In the dual role as researcher and planner, team members soon saw that much of the base-line data collected was still not very helpful for actually designing and costing a reliable community development program. For example, while the study clearly was not a matter of viewing reality from the comfort of an urban office, the team was not able to spend enough time in all of the villages which were directly involved in the project. It was clearly impossible to drive through all

of the villages, let alone spend one or two days participating in a series of community, town-hall types of meetings. To illustrate this further, females rarely participated in hamlet or village-level meetings. Yet, women carry out much of the simple horticultural activities, especially in fishing villages where the men are busy repairing boats and nets, when they are not out catching the fish that will constitute the family's cash income. The under-representation of women at public meetings may have detracted from the validity of some of the findings concerning community goals and aspirations. It is quite likely that men wanted different things (e.g., mosques, fishing boats, motors, fish auction facilities) than the women wanted.

Most of what was investigated directly related to the overall project, or so we believed. Without a direct knowledge of the local dialects, the team had to rely on translators who were sometimes viewed by local people with suspicion because they were from different villages.

Another problem involved the use of questionnaires. Survey data obtained by a questionnaire format was impossible because most of the people could not even read or write their own language, let alone the national language. Hence, a convenience sample chosen more or less by happenstance had to be developed and the opinions obtained through a limited number of local interviews ($N = 67$) probably did not adequately represent the opinions of a cross-section of the population. By comparing information from interviews with information obtained at meetings and from government officials we can be fairly sure that we have generally valid data. But, it would be difficult to determine the validity of specific conclusions.

The team attempted to be diplomatic and polite, even to the point of timidity. We did not want to knowingly insult the local people. It was difficult, therefore, to cross-examine an informant on a sticky point. For example, a village official who would go to extraordinary lengths to obtain old records concerning land tenure, even though everyone had previously denied that those records still existed, could not then be pressed to give further details. Situations occur where it is impolite, or even rude, to keep insisting on certain kinds of information. The researcher in the field in a third world country—particularly on a short-term assignment—must draw conclusions which she or he would not be as willing to draw if the research was being done in Kansas or Saskatchewan. Research findings in third world countries may also be influenced by barriers which constrain true dialogue between the participants because of different cultural backgrounds, expectations and professional training.

There are many more constraints to reliability and validity in a short-term consultancy project, many of which are faced by com-

munity development specialists in North America as well. Perhaps the biggest single factor concerns constraints in multi-disciplinary team work.

Constraints in team work. The reliability and validity of the data gathered may have been influenced by the multi-disciplinary nature of the research. The Canadian team was composed of a fisheries expert, an agronomist with training in agricultural economics, and an agricultural economist. In addition, the author, a sociologist with training in community development, Indonesian language, culture and history rounded out the team. Constraints to team work are often not reported because it is sometimes assumed that criticism of the shortcomings of the team members tends to impugn one's colleagues (Chambers, 1983, p. 55). Apart from personal differences unrelated to professional training, other constraints to team work occur due to professional "blindness" that divide experts.

The other Canadian team members were not community development specialists. Their professional identity did not involve training in the sociological factors to which community development experts are attuned. This was quickly discovered by their attitudes toward the myriad of cultural differences which surrounded them. One of the first things one learns in sociology is that different cultures can vary considerably in expectations concerning time, personal space, exchange of gifts, perceptions of nepotism, legitimate expressions of conflict, ways of expressing friendship, attitudes about sexuality, plus a host of other factors. When a social science researcher investigates a community with a sub-culture all its own many kinds of cultural variables are taken into account. Community development specialists are trained to look at interaction and exchange relations in such a way as to be sensitive to qualitative factors (Schwartz & Jacobs, 1979) as well as quantitative variables. In this study there was a considerable difference in concerns. For example, there was a professional (and perhaps also generational) difference in attitudes concerning time schedules and setting up of appointments. One of the older members stressed a level of punctuality at meetings that went beyond mere promptness. That may have hampered field work in a culture where punctuality is not a common virtue. (In Indonesia it is not at all unusual for someone to come to an appointment one hour late and not feel late at all.) In addition, older team members were also less willing to remain in the field for extended periods of time and had different attitudes toward use of leisure time than younger members.

One of the keys to the team's success was the ability of individual team members to speak the national language. Two of the team members, however, did not even learn basic expressions. They also

tended to regard Indonesian counterparts simply in terms of instrumental relations and not as individuals. Cultural differences also tended to anger team members who were not particularly interested in the communities. The intensity of the work schedule tended to magnify very minor differences in attitudes, promoting arguments and bad feelings. It did not help to be separated from families and friends at home, with the only communication possible being by telegraph. (There was no regular mail service.) At times a spiral of disharmonious relations developed among team members because there was no opportunity to relax by oneself.

Some of the constraints on team work could have been removed if there had been a clearer sense of a common goal. Team members were briefed on their roles with emphasis on separate responsibilities. The importance of the cooperative research was not emphasized. At briefings a good deal of time was spent on the logistics of trips to and from the field site. The ways and means team members should cooperate was left to each of the individual experts.

It was also made clear in subtle ways that the final report was merely a step in a procedure. A document attested to as the product of research by "experts" was clearly needed because an outside authority dictated the need for such a report, but at times it seemed that it was more of a ritual activity than a substantive one. A sense of common purpose was sometimes lacking because the common goal was frequently perceived as a bureaucratic ritual.

The Community Development Design Process

A major project goal was to produce a development model and "project design" that would be acceptable to members of the community and to officials within the Canadian International Development Agency, or another foreign donor agency. (Although C.I.D.A. was funding the research, there was no guarantee that the Canadian government would pick up the actual implementation of the project.) Thus, the project involved not only producing base-line data, but also included developing an integrated, rural community development project which could be undertaken by the Government of Indonesia with support from a foreign donor agency (e.g., U.S. A.I.D., World Bank, etc.). The team was entrusted with the responsibility of writing a comprehensive, five-year development plan for two sub-districts that would not only benefit all sectors within the communities but would also convince bureaucrats of its feasibility and likelihood of acceptance by local officials.

The problem of writing a project design was compounded by the

multi-disciplinary nature of the team. If all of the Canadian team members had a background in the rudiments of community development it is likely that some of the conflicts among team members could have been avoided. As it was, every aspect of the design had to be worked out through lengthy discussions and mutual compromises. Because of the intensive work schedule relatively minor differences would build up to the point of conflict. There simply was no time to think things over and let matters rest for awhile. Decisions had to be made quickly and, once made, had to be respected and defended. Luckily the team members were willing to work together to a large extent. For example, the fisheries expert and the agronomist helped with the interviews. When it came time to write the proposals they had a good understanding of the community development aspects of the project design because they had spent time talking to local peasant cultivators whose answers had no direct relation to their specialized research interests but helped integrate their own specific interests into the overall project.

Two other factors which are not often discussed in the literature are important in many developing countries. They involve the attitudes of local officials and general constraints to development in critical, subsistence regions and communities.

Attitudes of officials. Indonesian officials outside the study area were often reluctant to accept conclusions concerning specific aspects of the relative lack of development in the two sub-districts studied. There was a tendency for officials at the district, provincial and national levels to talk and act as if programs which had been officially announced at the national level had actually been implemented. In fact, many such programs had not been implemented. To be fair to national-level planning officials, they understood that many of the programs they had seen officially announced could not possibly have been initiated, much less implemented, in every village. Nevertheless, they would privately admit to the existence of stumbling blocks but would almost always avoid mentioning them at public meetings.

Reluctance to picture things as bleak was especially clear at the provincial level. Team members were able to clearly identify which programs were not in place. For example, standards set by the national government were certainly not met with regard to health and education. A straightforward, factual presentation of high incidences of disease and mortality or illiteracy and lack of school attendance was not always easy for provincial officials to hear and may not have been—considering the delicate political balance—the most relevant information to report. Officials who were strongly opposed to the Canadian team's interpretations made it clear that they did not want

the report to reflect poorly on the progress that had been made in Indonesia during the last Five Year Plan. Thus they dismissed reports of high levels of illiteracy, inadequate housing, poor health and poverty. Although they were familiar with conditions in inner island Indonesia, team members could not convince them that the actual situation in the communities studied was critical.

One way this problem may have been circumvented would have been to place more responsibility for reporting the findings of our research in the hands of our Indonesian counterparts. While they contributed greatly to the formalization of project proposals, they were reluctant to speak out. Even at district-level meetings they tended to let us do the talking.⁶ They also were not present at provincial and national-level meetings due to cost and time factors. That meant that the report tended to be viewed as a Canadian team effort, and not as a joint effort. Thus, Indonesian officials at the provincial and national levels tended to assume that the study team did not really understand the situation. Whenever interpretations differed it was assumed that the Canadian viewpoint was probably incorrect. Indonesian officials were so used to studies which were largely a product of "development tourism"⁷ (Chambers, 1983) and they were sometimes reluctant to take facts at face value. Yet, most of the data had been collected with guidance from Indonesian team members, most of whom had lived in the study communities all their lives.

⁶ Indonesian cultural values are in some ways diametrically opposite to North American values concerning individualism and egalitarianism. Status differences are more keenly felt in Indonesia than in the United States or Canada. Our counterparts usually deferred to Indonesian officials from higher levels of government. As outsiders we were much freer to criticize and to make suggestions.

⁷ Chambers (1983: 10-12) defines "rural development tourism" as the phenomenon of the brief visit to a rural area in a developing country by administrators, academics and technical specialists. "The visits may be for one day or for several. The 'tourists' or visitors may come from a foreign country, a capital city, a seat of regional or provincial government, a district headquarters, or some smaller urban place. Most commonly they are government officials—administrators, health staff, agriculturalists, veterinarians, animal husbandry staff, educators, community developers, engineers, foresters, or inspectors of this or that; but they may also be private technical specialists, academic researchers, the staff of voluntary agencies, journalists, diplomats, politicians, consultants, or the staff of aid agencies." The visitors come from urban areas, want to find something out, and have little time. The visit is undertaken to find something out, but time constraints make it impossible to probe. "Speeches are made. School children sing or clap. Photographs are taken. Buildings, machines, construction works, new crops, exotic animals, the clinic, the school, the new road, are all inspected. A self-conscious group (the self-help committee, the women's handicraft class), dressed in their best clothes, are seen and spoken to." But little more is accomplished. The real situation is barely glimpsed, if perceived at all.

National and provincial Indonesian officials were not the only ones who constrained the design of the project. There was also the problem of convincing Canadian officials. Some Canadian International Development Agency officials tended to believe that because of their generalized skills they only had to make very short visits to the field site to obtain reliable information for making recommendations rather than more time consuming, indepth research. Thus, team members were viewed as technically competent but not aware enough of the whole picture, particularly with regard to the Canadian International Development Agency bureaucracy and Canadian foreign policy. The overall design of the project was influenced by the implicit expectations of Canadian officials. Even though team members had been hired as short-term consultants in order to examine the situation at first hand, there continued to be an assumption that any really problematic considerations had to be evaluated by officials following the report through proper bureaucratic channels within the Canadian International Development Agency. Therefore, team members sometimes felt—particularly toward the end of the project—that our efforts both in data gathering and in project design were largely ritual activities.

HOW WAS THE REPORT USED?

The research work turned out to be much more than a mere ritual activity. Fears that the report would merely wind up on a shelf gathering dust were misplaced, but it took time before that became clear. After the report had been prepared (i.e., written in English, translated into *Bahasa Indonesia*, typed, collated and bound; see RDIAP, 1982), it was presented to the departments within the Ministry of Public Works which had officially requested the research and which had provided staff, counterparts and logistical support. The Indonesian language version of the report was evaluated as credible and usable by officials in the Ministry. In addition, it was also read and commented on by other national-level officials. After some delay it was distributed at the provincial, district and sub-district levels, where summaries of the preliminary findings were presented at formal and informal meetings.

After acceptance by representatives of the Government of Indonesia, an English language version of the report was read by officials in Ottawa-Hull. (A French version was not prepared, despite the general insistence on "bilingual" government reports.) Since the study had already been officially accepted in Jakarta, Canadian Interna-

tional Development Agency officials were faced with a *fait accompli*. That is unusual because most reports are not finished until after researchers have returned home. Team members were not invited for a debriefing, because it was felt that the expense was not warranted. The final document was then shelved after the team leader gave a brief report.⁸

The team's report had been presented to the government of Indonesia in August 1982. In January 1984 the Canadian International Development Agency began the process of reaching a decision on implementation. By August 1984, a formal decision had been reached to go ahead. A Canadian advisor was selected to go to Indonesia for a period of two to three years to help implement the five year project. The advisor will monitor the use of Canadian foreign assistance funds and help local officials. The advisor hired is a fisheries expert, not experienced in wider agricultural, social or community issues. Meanwhile, some of the team's recommendations had already been incorporated into the Indonesian budgeting process.

As the decision to implement began to seem more real, the Canadian International Development Agency became interested once again in having direct reports on conditions in the two sub-districts and invited the author to make a number of presentations. Clear factual material suddenly became very important 1½ years after the actual research work. The decision to implement project proposals had not hinged on the facts at all, but was based on implicit political and bureaucratic factors, as well as the explicit goal of development in poor areas. Once the overall decision to go ahead had been made the research work performed by the team became very relevant in the designation of specific project recommendations. The present research work is similar in some ways to the approach recommended by Collinson (1981) on the basis of work done in East Africa with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center. The present data gathering can be viewed as an exploratory survey or baseline survey. A formal, verification survey is probably not needed and may not even be possible. By combining the work of data collection and project design the team was able to integrate the research findings, sometimes in ways not anticipated at the outset. The Canadian advisor in the field will be able to use the survey and recommendations to

⁸ The lack of a de-briefing was keenly felt as a loss. It seemed at the time that our work had no logical conclusion. Since a de-briefing had been written into our contracts we had hoped to be able to present our findings in person and discuss the detailed proposals carefully, item by item.

help guide further development efforts. While the information gathered may not be as reliable and valid as data collected by a community development worker with thirty years of experience in the area (e.g., Mingneau, 1973), it is still valuable.

Six key steps essential to data gathering and project design were uncovered. They are:

1. *Role Differentiation and Integration:* Coordination of specialized roles of different team members was the first major step. It is very important to reach a working definition of each team member's specialized terms of reference and general responsibilities to the team. A multidisciplinary team must be integrated with regard to team work roles.
2. *Working with Counterparts:* The actual process of collecting, coding and tabulating the quantitative data had to be done, just as in any study in North America; but, logistical, cultural, linguistic, bureaucratic and personal constraints had to be overcome that might not have been as strong in Ontario or Wisconsin. Thus, it was of great importance to coordinate the efforts of the Canadian team and the Indonesian counterpart team as much as possible.
3. *Maintaining Liason:* As the work progressed it was necessary to make sure that both Indonesian and Canadian government officials were kept well informed.
4. *Designing the Project:* Unlike many other community development projects where outside consultants are hired to provide base-line data and general recommendations, team members were required to make very specific project proposals, with carefully elaborated targets and clear, accurate costing packages.
5. *Selling the Study and Project:* Once the data were gathered and the project designed, team members found themselves in the role of salesman trying to convince others of its feasibility and value.
6. *Self Evaluation:* The last step has been self-evaluation. An intensive field work experience of this kind is a good learning experience. Some of the lessons learned become clarified only after a considerable lapse of time. It is critical for researchers to be consulted at later stages of the decision-making process. Moreover, it is important for researchers to get feedback to find out if project proposals have been implemented and if they have been successful or not. Since expectations have been built up among members of the local communities, researchers are justifiably concerned that those hopes have not been raised in vain. This last stage is important for agencies to consider.

CONCLUSION

This discussion of an integrated, rural community development effort in Indonesia, is fairly typical of the data gathering and project design phases of community development projects in other third world settings.⁹ The problems encountered by the team may have more general applicability. While factual material presented here concerns two traditional agricultural and fishing communities in Southeast Asia the problems of data collection and use of data to design a viable development project are believed to be relevant as well to community development processes in Colorado or Manitoba.

The following factors should be considered by community development specialists who find themselves involved in similar development efforts here or abroad:

1. *Interpersonal Relations:* Open and honest communication and effective conflict resolution are crucial. Professional and cultural (or, sub-cultural) differences should be anticipated. Practice role playing during the briefing sessions might be very helpful. Coordination of specialized roles of different team members is critical. It is important to reach a working definition of each team member's specialized terms of reference and general responsibilities to the team. A multidisciplinary team must be integrated with regard to team work roles. As the work progresses it may be necessary to make sure that decision makers and officials are kept well informed. It may be necessary to sacrifice time that could be spent in the field. Maintenance of liason should be a priority.
2. *Qualitative Factors:* Do not place technical solutions too high on the list of priorities until you have a clear idea of local circumstances. The eventual success of the project may have as much to do with qualitative, sociological factors as it does with specialized, technical concerns.
3. *Community Goals:* Do not lose sight of the goals which the members of the community wish to achieve. Being receptive to solutions offered by local people to their own local problems is perhaps the most crucial factor of all.
4. *Self Evaluation:* The last step is self-evaluation. Some of the lessons learned become clarified only after a considerable lapse of time. It is critical for researchers to be consulted at later

⁹ For a general analysis of class relations in agrarian societies see Stavenhagen (1975). For a more detailed analysis of exploitation and its effects in colonial Indonesia, particularly with respect to land use, see Bakker (1983).

stages of the decision-making process. Moreover, it is important for researchers to get feedback to find out if project proposals have been implemented and if they have been successful or not.

While there are many constraints to data gathering and project design, it is possible to find solutions appropriate to the community's needs. Critical self-assessment can help to clarify both the constraints and the opportunities. Candid disclosure of some of the problems encountered in a research effort of this kind can help to clarify the steps that can be taken to improve efforts another time.

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