

GREAT POWERS

AND

LITTLE WARS

The Limits of Power

Edited

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and

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PRAEGER

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Great Powers
and
Little Wars

3

The Aceh War and the Creation of the Netherlands East Indies State

J. I. (Hans) Bakker

This chapter is about a "little war" that took place between the Netherlands and an area known as Aceh in Indonesia. As a modern, but "underdeveloped" nation-state, Indonesia is a product of its history, particularly its colonial history.¹ A key aspect of the relationship between Indonesia and the Netherlands is the Aceh War (1873-1913). This chapter will examine the war, survey Aceh's history and culture, look at four "lives as mirrors" of the situation, and critique the colonial policy. The main thesis presented here is that the support given to the so-called chiefs by the Dutch colonial government in later phases of the war was based on lack of good intelligence about the sociological situation. The guerilla struggles against Islamic leaders were, it will be argued, largely unnecessary. They could have been avoided if the Dutch had not attempted to incorporate Aceh² into the Netherlands East Indies, had negotiated with the sultan in good faith before 1873, or had taken a different approach to the conduct of the war.

The war in Aceh was a little war on the scale of things in world history. But it was tremendously important to the creation of the Netherlands East Indies colonial state, and hence to the Netherlands. It was also a watershed in the history of the archipelago.³ The Aceh guerilla struggles against the Dutch represent extremely important proto-nationalist, peasant social "protest movements."⁴ It is important to note at the outset that the form and structure of the nation-state that is now known as Indonesia is a direct consequence of the Aceh War and its colonial aftermath, the so-called ethical policy.⁵ Even in postcolonial, independent Indonesia the struggle between traditional, local Islamic authority and the authority of the nation-state of Indonesia as a whole has continued to play a very important role.⁶

The military struggles that took place in Aceh for forty years, from 1873 to 1913, were, however, of central importance in shaping the Netherlands East Indies colonial state and, eventually, the Republic of Indonesia. The Aceh War is as much a part of Indonesian and world history as it is of Sumatran and Dutch colonial history.

The Great Power involved in the struggles was the Netherlands; it was largely due to the fact that the Netherlands held the Netherlands East Indies that the small country in Western Europe, popularly called Holland, continued to have any influence on the world stage. The Netherlands had not been a significant world power since the seventeenth century, but the East Indies gave the Netherlands at least some claim to economic and political power in the world. Dutch power in northern Sumatra resulted from the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra between the Netherlands and Great Britain. Britain was the major European competitor of the Dutch in the region; the treaty created a British umbrella for Dutch military action.⁷

The Kingdom of the United Netherlands was created after the Napoleonic Wars. Previously, the Netherlands had been a republic. The British were interested in seeing a strong buffer between themselves and the other European powers. Hence, the archipelago was returned to the Netherlands by the British in 1816, after a brief interregnum under Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles (r. 1811-15). Investment necessary for industrialization was possible in Holland in part because of the increase of income from the Netherlands Indies and the subsequent growth of the shipping sector and the expansion of foreign trade in general.⁸ Although it is questionable whether one would be correct to take a Leninist view of "imperialist exploitation" as the key factor in the development of "finance capital," there can be little question that the Netherlands benefited from the expansion of colonial activity.⁹

The Netherlands had no real treaty with Aceh and had no legal or moral-ethical claim over the region whatsoever. The only claim was based on the "white man's burden" and the fact that the Kingdom of the Netherlands was struggling to be a world power.¹⁰ Many other small principalities in the archipelago had signed a type of treaty with the Netherlands East Indies (N.E.I.) government, but Aceh had never done so.¹¹ After the 1871 Treaty of Sumatra, however, between the Netherlands and Britain "an attitude arose in Batavia that war with Atjeh was inevitable. After the 1871 Treaty, Dutch leaders wished to delay no longer lest other Powers be provoked to intervene. Fear of eventual foreign intervention was therefore the main motive for the war."¹² The Netherlands refused to negotiate with the responsible Acehnese leaders in Banda Aceh. The rigidity with which the arbitrary annexation of Aceh was upheld made a

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satisfactory compromise solution impossible. The Dutch leadership was placed in an "acute dilemma. . . . [T]he only feasible alternatives were withdrawal or complete conquest. The first was ruled out by Dutch fear of the reaction in other parts of the [colonial] empire. The second was long delayed by financial and military weakness."¹³ Except for the Java War of 1825-30, which had strained Dutch resources, the Dutch colonial empire in the archipelago largely had been built up by naval power and diplomatic treaties, not by military force. The whole N.E.I. military force in the archipelago—with Indonesian recruits led by European officers—probably numbered no more than 30,000 men.

The military course of the war is summarized in English by C. M. Schulten in a succinct article entitled "Tactics of the Dutch Colonial Army in the Netherlands East Indies."¹⁴ Schulten argues that the war had three phases: 1873-93, 1894-1903, and 1904-13.

The first phase of the Aceh War (1873-93) included the First Aceh Expedition of 1873, the Second Aceh Expedition of 1873-74, and the "Concentrated Line" of 1883-93. In March 1873, the Netherlands East India army, the KNIL, bombarded the town of Banda Aceh (Kutaraja), the Acehnese capital. The town of Banda Aceh, located near the sultan's fortress, or "Kraton," was the main military objective. A long history of colonial expansion in the archipelago had preceded that event.¹⁵ An expeditionary force left Batavia on 22 March 1873 under the command of Major General J. H. R. Kohler. The four infantry battalions were well equipped, two of them with modern rifles. The artillery had twelve pieces. The plan was to advance on the sultan's fortified palace, the Kraton (*dalam*), and take it over. The Kraton was thought of as the administrative center of Aceh, and the Dutch felt that if they could occupy it they would have won the war. In April, a force of 3,000 men were landed, but they were beaten back from the Kraton. The KNIL soldiers captured the mosque after heavy fighting, but General Kohler was killed when visiting the mosque. The Dutch force left on 25 April with a loss of eighty men and the general. The expedition had been organized in haste because of the impending monsoons. Sultan Mahmud Syah (r. 1870-74) was able to organize a well-armed and determined resistance.¹⁶ The expedition did not accomplish its objective—the takeover of the sultan's palace—but the second expedition did.¹⁷ However, since the planned objective was based on an overestimation of the real power of the sultan's court in the region outside of Aceh Major, it was not politically successful. The second Dutch expedition was quickly dispatched late in 1873 in order to save face. This

was the largest military force the Dutch had ever assembled in the Netherlands East Indies: "8,500 troops, 4,300 servants and coolies, with a further reserve of 1,500 troops soon added."¹⁸ The second expedition was commanded by Lieutenant General J. van Swieten. "All infantrymen had Beaumont rifles and the artillery had been reinforced with six bronze breech-loading 12 cm hastily sent from Holland."¹⁹ The Kraton was captured on 24 January 1874.

Though the KNIL had captured Banda Aceh (i.e., the harbor of Aceh proper), Sultan Mahmud Syah had retreated to the hills. Although he soon died of cholera, a new leader was chosen and named Sultan Ibrahim Mansur Syah (r. 1875-1907). He was largely a symbolic figurehead but nevertheless helped to unify opposition, even though he could not direct specific campaigns. Most of the uleebelangs, or "trader-chief-judges," gave up fairly quickly after the death of the sultan in 1874, but armed resistance continued in the hills and a number of military expeditions were required. The detailed chronology of those military activities reveals no important battles. Instead, the KNIL was able to defeat the peasant forces only through a long and arduous series of skirmishes in the hill country above Aceh proper. During the course of the war, the guerilla fighters who supported the sultan and Islamic rule were tenacious bands of peasants who were connected to one another through Islamic brotherhood first and foremost. However, kinships and village ties were also a factor.

During the first phase of the war, the armed struggle changed from outright warfare to guerilla war. Major General J. L. J. J. Pel was commander in Aceh; he realized that it would be necessary to undertake an offensive so he began to order his troops to advance into the interior in January 1875. His tactic was to encircle the Acehnese and then eliminate the guerillas, but such elimination was probably impossible. Major General K. van der Heyden managed to bring Aceh to a certain degree of law and order, but Europeans were continually harassed.²⁰ A system of fortifications was set up and roads were built. The Korps Marechaussee, commanded by European officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs), was initially organized for counterguerilla operations within the Concentrated Line.²¹ After 1893 the strategy of a Concentrated Line was abandoned but these elite troops continued to operate.²²

In the second phase of the war between 1894 and 1903, there were no more large-scale expeditions or chains of defense posts. Mobile columns and small patrols ranged across Aceh. A significant event during the second phase of the war was Teuku Umar's "treason." The N.E.I. government involved Acehnese leader Teuku Umar in the fighting, but in 1896 he switched allegiance and turned against the Dutch. He had 1,000 men

equipped with 350 Beaumont rifles and 500 muzzle loaders. Teuku Umar was pursued by the colonial army and ambushed in 1899; he was killed in the ensuing fight. This was under the leadership of J. B. van Heutsz, who had been appointed civil military governor of Aceh and dependencies in 1898. The Gayo Expedition of 1900-1903 under Lieutenant Colonel L. L. E. van Daalen resulted in the death of just under 3,000 Gayo and Alas peasants, more than a third of whom were women and children.

The last phase of the war, between 1904 and 1913, involved continued fighting using guerilla tactics against local leaders. These leaders were also religious reformers.²³ They fought a holy war against the Dutch infidel.²⁴ The Acehese guerillas were skilled in the use of swords called klewangs.²⁵ Most of the fighting was done by N.E.I. infantry, since cavalry and artillery were generally of little use. Patrols of fifteen men marching in a double file kept up steady pressure to eliminate band leaders. "When a leader had been killed, he was to be identified by the local people in order to bring it home to them that resistance had effectively been crushed."²⁶

Although it was a "little war," it lasted forty years. The total number of KNIL forces in Aceh numbered between 6,000 and 8,000 men at any one time, about a fifth of the total infantry forces in the archipelago. Among the N.E.I. forces, approximately 7,700 KNIL officers and soldiers died from battle or disease and 9,000 or more were wounded. Tens of thousands of Acehese guerilla fighters, at least 30,000 and very likely as many as 100,000, died in battle or as a result of diseases like cholera and malaria.²⁷

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This small war illustrates not only the limits of the military in colonial wars and guerilla struggles but also the political and economic significance of the use of military power during colonial times. The sociological background makes it abundantly clear, in retrospect, that this war was fought purely for imperialist, Dutch colonial ends. It was inspired by the late-nineteenth-century European colonial expansion which took place worldwide, and it was carried out with inadequate intelligence information about the Acehese.

The Acehese "nation" of northern Sumatra was eventually conquered after a long, drawn-out war. Because the nation was not a true nation-state, the conquest of the capital town (Banda Aceh) and the central region (Aceh Major) was not sufficient to constitute N.E.I. authority in the whole of North Sumatra. The sultan did not rule over a European-style nation-state; he was a largely symbolic figurehead in a loose confederation of local groups and had very little national authority. The military conquest of Aceh and its dependencies, therefore, required a protracted guerilla struggle.

Instead of a solid political approach, based on an anthropological and a sociological understanding of the situation, the war and guerilla fighting was carried out for the N.E.I. government by the KNIL and especially the Korps Marechaussee.<sup>28</sup> The N.E.I. military was not inspired by Islamic beliefs concerning "just war," of course. The European officers and NCOs were inspired by a sense of "the white man's burden" and later on (after 1901) a trust in the value of an archipelago-wide "ethical policy" that had been enunciated in Parliament. The native troops were from diverse parts of the archipelago and drawn to the KNIL by good pay and a chance to escape their local conditions. Many KNIL soldiers were converts to Christianity from the island of Ambon or the Moluccas. Military conquest eventually made it possible to begin to consolidate discrete Acehnese groups and the Gayo and Alas "primitive societies" into one unified colonial territory, an Aceh that had never existed under the sultans. But the consolidation could have taken place with far less loss of life if the Dutch had been better informed.

Military success in Aceh led to the assumption that other independent principalities that were less likely to be difficult to defeat also should be treated as part of the Pax Neerlandica, which was to be the basis for a so-called ethical policy of imperialist expansion and consolidation.<sup>29</sup> Aceh had been one of the most difficult regions to conquer. With Aceh out of the way, it was possible for the N.E.I. to continue to utilize the momentum of political opinion and military force. Thus, the conquest of Aceh was the inspiration for a flurry of military and diplomatic activity that occurred throughout the archipelago in the first decade of the twentieth century. That surge of colonial takeover "created" Indonesia as a territorial entity and even had an important impact on Islamic reform movements.

The story of the Aceh War is not merely one of military conquest. Equally important, especially in the long run, is the story of the use of legitimate authority. As Max Weber has pointed out, domination requires the use of "legitimate authority" which is ideologically grounded and backed up, ultimately, with the ability to assert force.' "The Dutch were insufficiently aware of Achinese social structure. For instance, it was thought [in 1873-74] that an end to the armed conflict would come with the capture of the capital, the Kraton." Instead, the armed struggles lasted for forty years because the leadership did not really understand who they were fighting. The tactics and methods of guerilla warfare were copied, but the central ideological buttress of the peasant's struggle was not fully understood. The technology of weaponry was a factor in the military success of the KNIL, but it cannot be said that for Aceh the N.E.I. represented a truly superior social system

toward the European nation-state concept, but it would be a teleological fallacy to assume that Aceh needed to be forced to make the transition to colonial rule in order to benefit ultimately from being part of a nation-state called Indonesia.<sup>32</sup> The very concept of a nation-state that can be called Indonesia is derived from a linguistic analogy and a somewhat romanticized philosophical extension from the historical example of Sumatra or Java-based Hindu-Buddhist empires..<sup>33</sup>

Perhaps the biggest policy mistake made in the Aceh War was to engage in it at all. The decisions made about the best way to conduct the war were based on a lack of military intelligence and a general lack of good anthropological and sociological knowledge. As two political scientists have recently pointed out, "Fighting without good intelligence consists, at best, of mindless campaigns of destruction conducted in the hope that indiscriminate damage to the other side's arms and body will somehow affect vital but unknown pressure points."<sup>34</sup> The N.E.I. government, as well as the government of the Netherlands itself, did not initially know very much about the sociological realities of Aceh. The advice that eventually led it to a policy of killing the religious reformers and their followers helped the Dutch colonial forces to take control gradually, but the fact that the war lasted in one way or another for forty years was due to the fact that the N.E.I. did not have good intelligence about the enemy. This lack of a good knowledge base is surprising because of the legend that has grown up around the work of a Dutch professor of Arabic who played a key role in the war. It was always assumed by the N.E.I. administration that the war was being fought in the best possible manner against a "fanatical" enemy; actually, it was being fought on the basis of trial and error.

The military aspects of the Aceh War are revealed through the details of many small battles between the KNIL and guerilla forces. For example, the experiment of setting up a Concentrated Line,<sup>35</sup> which was tried for ten years (1883-93), was not successful. The Concentrated Line strategy was a good example of a military failure based on faulty knowledge. Similarly, the policy of using native Acehnese leaders like Teuku Umar also was not successful. Time and again, armed resistance would flare up and KNIL troops would be subject to *klewang* attacks by men who believed that death in battle in a holy war would mean direct passage to paradise.

Eventually, the war was ended. It was ended through a policy that combined continued use of a military force of mercenary "native" Indonesian soldiers, mainly from Christianized areas in the Moluccas and North Sulawesi (led by European officers and NCOs). Political stability was eventually gained through support of the *ulebelang* at the expense of the

cultivators, the common people who had been exploited by those chiefs even under the sultans.<sup>36</sup> These two aspects of the war (i.e., support of the chiefs and military force) can be illustrated by the lives of four colorful individuals: a guerilla fighter and a contemporary Islamic reformer, on the one side, and a Dutch general and a Dutch professor, on the other. The lives of the four actors illustrate the more general, abstract sociological forces at work. But first it is necessary to look at Aceh's history and culture.

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The Aceh War took place in the region of northern Sumatra, in the current "Special Province of Aceh."³⁷ The island of Sumatra is one of the largest islands in the Indonesian archipelago, but it is not as densely populated and not as well known to nonspecialists as Java and Bali. In the first century A.D. the early Brahmans called Sumatra "the islands of gold" (Suvarnavipa). In the seventh century the kingdom of Srivijaya controlled most of northeastern Sumatra. The oldest inscription dates from 683 A.D. and may refer to the foundation of the capital of Srivijaya near present-day Palembang. Srivijaya was ruled by the Sailendra Dynasty and based on Tantric Vajrayana Buddhism. There was extensive contact between Srivijaya and other parts of the world, including latter-day Malacca, China, and probably Persia.³⁸

The coast and high plateaus of the northern part of the island of Sumatra are the homes of the ethnic and linguistic groups known as the Acehnese, the Gayo (Gajo), and the Alas. The original inhabitants of Aceh proper may resemble the mountain peoples of Gayo and Alas, who may themselves have come from other regions. "Legend has it that the original population of Atjeh were the Orang Mantir, who were long ago driven out by the Bataks."³⁹ Islam was originally imported to northern Sumatra from Gujarat in northwestern India, perhaps as early as the ninth century. Some ninth century Arabic documents mention a place called Lamuri (or Ramni) east of Aceh head, between the "sea of Harkand" (i.e., the Bay of Bengal) and the "Sea of Salaht" (i.e., the Malay Straits).⁴⁰ Chinese documents from the thirteenth century mention "Lan wu li." They may have been referring to Pedir, which is along the coast in view of the Lamuri Mountains. Tome Pires, the famous explorer, mentions "Lambry next to Achin."⁴¹ Thus, there was some Islamic influence from India very early on, but from the seventeenth century on there was increasing Arabian orthodox influence as well as Ottoman Turkish influences.

Little is factually known about the origin of the Acehnese people. It has been argued that they originated in a Chamic (Champa) region in the Indo-

languages found in southern Vietnam and Cambodia. They are Austronesian or Austro-Asiatic in terms of their linguistic classification, rather than Malayo-Polynesian." Interestingly, Malay (Malayu) was the language of the court in earlier times, but in the nineteenth century only a few traders knew the language.⁴³ The lowland Acehnese were influenced by Hindu and Buddhist kingdoms in India and to the southeast, but they were among the first in the archipelago to be converted to Islam.⁴⁴ The name Aceh, which the Acehnese give to their language and culture, first appears in the historical record after 1500, when it was used to refer to the port kingdom of Banda Aceh. When Marco Polo visited the north coast of Sumatra on his return journey, late in the thirteenth century (1292 A.D.), he notes Muslim principalities in "Ferlec" (possibly Perlak), "Basman" (Peusangan), "Samara" (Samalanga), "Dagroian" (Pidie), and "Lambri" (Banda Aceh itself). Marco Polo's account is the first direct observation by a European of an Islamic state in Southeast Asia. Aceh has been very important historically because the Acehnese live along the coast in a region that has been characterized by long-distance trade.⁴⁵

By the nineteenth century the Acehnese were strongly influenced by Islam, and today the Acehnese are still staunchly Islamic.⁴⁶ But Acehnese Islam has an Indic, rather than fundamentally Arabic, origin and is in some ways distinctively Shiite and mystical.⁴⁷ There are also Sunni elements in Acehnese Islam.⁴⁸ Heterodox pantheistic Sufi mysticism was a third element and included veneration of saints.⁴⁹

Aceh can be divided into four main ecological regions: Aceh Basar (i.e., Aceh Major, literally "big Aceh"; or Aceh proper, including the harbor Banda Aceh and the valley along the Aceh River), Pidie, Timo (the East), and Barat (the West). Aceh proper is at the mouth of the Aceh River and is flanked by mountains. In the narrow river valley there is rice cultivation. Pidie was the site of an independent principality until it was conquered in the sixteenth century.⁵⁰ It is on a broad plain intersected by three rivers and is an important irrigated rice cultivation area. Most of the rest of the modern Province of Aceh was settled either by early pioneers or eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pioneers from Aceh proper and Pidie. There also has been considerable intermingling with Minangkabau people along the western coast and with Malay-speaking Tamiang people along the eastern coast. Before the Dutch, Aceh Major (Aceh Basar—outside of the actual domain of the sultan and his court) was divided into three provinces (*sagi*). In Dutch colonial times Aceh was divided into six districts: (1) Aceh Major (or Great Aceh), with its three *mukim*; (2) Pidie; (3) North Coast; (4) East Coast; (5) Gayo and Alas; and (6) West Coast. These districts were further divided into subdistricts, also called *mukim*. (The Acehnese word *mukim*

is derived from the Arabic *moqim*, resident of a Friday prayer area.) The *mukim* are not indigenous in the sense of being pre-Islamic but derive instead from the height of the sultanate.⁵¹ The small *mukim* were further subdivided again into villages (*gampong*). The hierarchical division resembles the Javan regency, subregency, and "desa."⁵²

Aceh has been further divided into many small units, even from the earliest times, although there are traces of four tribes or extended families (*kawom*, from the Arabic *kawm*, people). The heads of the four tribes originally were called *uleebelangs*. The name gradually covered all kinds of chiefs, not just the heads of the four tribes. These chiefs were also traders and to a certain extent they feuded among one another for commercial trading rights, but they should not be considered the equivalent of Western European or Japanese medieval feudal barons or knights. They controlled markets and trade as best they could, using import and export duties (*wasé*). They did not collect a head tax or a tribute based on village liability. They did not collect property tax. With a few exceptions, they did not exact corvée labor from the common people. Obviously, the exact status role of the *uleebelang* varied from place to place and over time period to time period."

The *uleebelang* were generally loyal to the sultan of the port of Aceh, whom they called raja or poteu (i.e., "our master"). However, there was no clear-cut obligation of the trader-chiefs to the sultans.⁵⁴ If the sultan could exert power, then the trader-chiefs were forced to accept that power. When the sultans were less powerful, the *uleebelangs* were still interested in acquiring documents from the sultan to indicate their social position. Those letters patent (*sarakata*) would proclaim them *uleebelang* of their district (*nanggrou*). Though the trader-chiefs were concerned about receiving letters patent, if they did not receive them, it did not necessarily hinder them from continuing with their activities, especially the collection of a 5 to 10 percent tariff on exports and imports.

As pioneer settlement occurred along the eastern and western coasts of North Sumatra, many of those who had worked as middlemen (*peutuha pangkai*) for the *uleebelang* eventually rose to *uleebelang* status themselves. Thus, for example, many peasants left Pidie and settled along the East Aceh coast. They would form new districts which would then have new trader-chiefs. Those new trader-chiefs would take the title *uleebelang*, even though they had been middlemen back in Aceh proper or Pidie. That migration resulted in the establishment of many new districts. The pioneer expansion along the east and west coasts of the Sumatra peninsula promoted trade and increased the prosperity of the sultans.

The sultans and their male relatives bore the title *tuanku* (from the Malayu *wan aku*, or "my lord"). The title *raja* or *imam* was used widely by various kinds of trader-chiefs. The male members of the *uleebelang'* s extended families were called *teuku*. Historically there has been an inflation in the use of titles. Titles once reserved only for the aristocracy surrounding the sultan eventually were used more freely by those who filled various functions outside of the sultan's immediate domain.

Pedak and Pasai (formerly Samudra) were important trading centers of power along the coast. By the early sixteenth century, the various small centers were united under Sultan Ali Mughayat Shah (d. 1530?). Aceh reached political prominence under Sultan Iskandar Muda (1607-36). His navy controlled the ports, hence he had political influence on both sides of the strait of Malacca and could exact tolls. He almost succeeded in taking Malacca from the Portuguese.⁵⁵

Aceh's power was based on its control of maritime commerce. Acehese rulers maintained contact with the Ottoman Turks and the Mughal Turks. Aceh was a "gate to the holy land" throughout the Malayo-Indonesian Islamic world. Many Islamic religious scholars lived and worked in Acehese ports, and in Mecca the Acehese religious foundations for students from the archipelago were well known. Like Malacca and Pasai, its greatness "was almost entirely in the hands of Gujerati [Gujarati] merchants."⁵⁶

The Gayo and Alas, on the other hand, have lived in the more mountainous region in the central part of the northern tip of the island since recorded history and have been less important historically. The Gayo language is independent of Acehese, and Alas is a northern Batak dialect. They have recognized the authority of Aceh almost from the first. They are an important part of the ethnic composition of the north of Sumatra, particularly around Lake Tawar and the Gayo Luos plain.⁵⁷ The military expeditions against the Gayo and Alas were particularly brutal and unnecessary. They never had been firmly consolidated into the Acehese nation; basically, they were just peripheral dependencies.

To the south live the Bataks. Some Batak chiefs received their rank from the sultans of Aceh.⁵⁸ The Bataks were pagans but had been strongly influenced by Islamic missionary activity, but the Dutch sent in Protestant missionaries and discouraged Islamic penetration. The Bataks occupied the colonial districts of Tapanuli and Padang Lawas. Padang Lawas was acquired by the Netherlands East Indies in 1838, after the Padri War (1821-38).⁵⁹

Further south live the Minangkabau; the center of Minangkabau is the Padang Highlands. The Minangkabau region was also incorporated into the

N.E.I. as a result of the Padri Wars.⁶⁰ Resistance to Dutch colonial rule was not unified, but another struggle, known as the Batak War, broke out in 1872; it ended in victory for the N.E.I., but guerilla resistance was not crushed until 1892. At the end of the Dutch colonial era there were approximately 1.5 million Minangkabau, 1 million Batak, and 650,000 Acehnese on Sumatra.⁶¹ The small islands west of Sumatra—Nias, Mentawai, and Engano—are also important for the history of the region. Nias, which was a source of slaves for Aceh, became part of the N.E.I. in 1863.

Aceh, therefore, is complex historically and culturally. The forty-year struggles in Aceh were a part of a larger current in history that had started earlier in other parts of the archipelago.⁶² With this historical and cultural background in mind, the lives of four individuals involved in the Aceh struggle—a guerilla leader, a contemporary Islamic reformer, a Dutch general, and a Dutch professor—will be investigated to provide a broader understanding of the war.

THE GUERRILLA LEADER

The man known today as a guerilla fighter was also an Islamic scholar or, *alem*; the Acehnese called him an *ulama*, or religious scholar.⁶³ He was learned in Islam, and in the nineteenth century he had the Acehnese title *teungku*.⁶⁴ He was a reformer who attempted to restore fallen mosques, tried to get people to practice their religious duties, renounced gambling and animal fights (e.g., cockfighting), and promoted the payment of religious tithes (*zakat*). He wanted to reform the legal administration of justice so that it came into accord with his understanding of Islamic law (*fikh*). He also opposed some of the chiefs' personal immoralities, such as opium smoking, adultery, and pederasty. He was an effective leader because he offered a message that was very attractive to poorly educated peasants. He wanted to build a new society on earth. He preached reform and Islamic revival. He was interested in creating a better society, a society where men were not tied to the particularism of their kinship and village. But what most appealed to the Acehnese villagers was religious reform as a prelude to paradise. They took the universalizing message of Islamic brotherhood in a very literal sense. The abolition of particularistic kinship ties in this world would be a step toward the alternative to this life in the next (i.e., the hereafter, the *achirat*).

Under his leadership, villagers constructed forts and provisioned them. These forts (*benteng*) were supplied by "holy war contributions" and were manned by peasant men (i.e., petty commodity producers) who believed

¹⁹ that if they died in battle they would immediately go to paradise. Death as a martyr (*sjahid*) in a holy war (*jihad*) would mean entering a place where everything is a hundred times better and "a heavenly princess . . . cradles you in her lap and wipes away the blood, her heart all yours."⁶⁵ The peasants who heeded his call opposed the Dutch infidels in the name of Islam and thereby escaped the restrictive bonds of matrilineal village life.⁶⁶

THE CONTEMPORARY ISLAMIC REFORMER

It was not until the twentieth century that the idea of a common identity as members of the Islamic faith could serve as a basis for effective ties among different people from different villages and sectors in Aceh. When the same idea that motivated the peasants who fought against Dutch colonialism was put forward in a later context, it probably came closer to the meaning originally intended.⁶⁷ Hence, it is useful to consider a "contemporary" Islamic reformer, an *ulama*, who played a significant role in Aceh in the 1940s, 1950s, and 1960s.

THE DUTCH GENERAL

The Dutch general did not understand Islam at all. He also knew very little about Aceh and its people, even though he spent many years there. He was a Dutch nationalist and a warrior. He introduced innovations in military strategy, like the rule that patrols should not march in single file but always two abreast and the rule that "patrols should never submit to the temptation to speed up the rate of march when pursuing the adversary since cohesion would then be lost." As a military leader he was a courageous man who was very forthright and utterly convinced of the rightness of his cause. In an age of bourgeois gentility, he did not hesitate to "call a spade a spade." He was viewed by many Dutchmen both at home and abroad as rude and arrogant. In addition to many actual accomplishments as a military leader, he also used ruse and deception to advance his career. He was not unfeeling, but he seems to have held military victory and Dutch supremacy above any other human or personal consideration. Like the Islamic guerilla fighters he opposed, he was utterly convinced he was right, although he does not seem to have been strongly influenced by religious belief. He did not hesitate to make difficult decisions concerning life and death; he was an effective field commander in a very unclear situation where action of any kind had to be undertaken on the basis of

uncertain information. Seen with the benefit of hindsight, it is clear that many of his decisions were probably wrong, but the fact that he was willing to make decisions helped place him at the top of the military hierarchy.

THE DUTCH PROFESSOR

The Dutch professor also was very convinced about the correctness of his views, although he was not a belligerent man. He was a scholar of great ability who studied Islamic values and beliefs in detail and had a deep insight into certain aspects of Acehnese life. His fluency in Arabic made it possible for him to be one of the first non-Arab, non-Islamic visitors to Mecca. He wrote a number of important books—some before the war and some after—which are still worth reading today. In the history of the Netherlands East Indies there have been many scholars who have revealed historical, anthropological, and sociological dimensions to Indonesian societies and nations in precise and objective terms, yet this particular scholar stands out as one of the best. Yet, despite his great erudition and his practical experience in the field, he probably made some fundamental mistakes in his assessment of the situation in Aceh which greatly limited the effectiveness of Dutch colonial rule in later decades.

The general and the professor worked together for a time and succeeded in creating the impression that the war had been won, even though it had not. The two, however, had a falling out and each went his own way. The general went on to become a very important governor general and the scholar became an important professor and an internationally recognized scholar.

We have set the stage and understand a bit about the individuals as social actors. We can now examine the individuals in a bit more biographical detail.

TEUNGKU CIK DI TORO

No "family" had as much of an impact on the early phase of the Aceh War as the Tiro family. The *ulamas* from Tiro are said to have originated with a Javanese *haji* who settled in Pidie. (A *haji* is an Islamic believer who has made the *haj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca.) Tiro became a famous center of Islamic learning, the site of an important Islamic school (Bahasa Indonesia, *pesantren*). The *haji's* son, Tengkoe Moehamad Amin di Toro, studied under an *ulama in* the Tiro district and since then the family has

been known as the Tiro *ulamas*. The grandson was Teungku Cik di Toro (1836-91), one of the most famous *ulamas* (or *imams*) of the Aceh War.⁶⁹

Teungku Cik di Toro had four sons—the great-grandsons of the original Javanese *haji*. Their names were Mat Amin; Majet; di Boekit Seboen, or Beb; and Lambada, or Lam. Teungku Cik di Toro led a force estimated at 6,000 men in a *perang sabil*, or holy war, against the colonial government, known as the *kuempeni*.⁷⁰ He sent letters to the *uleebelangs* encouraging them to fight for Allah. The letters begin with a greeting in Arabic and then continue: "To whom does the kingdom belong? The one, the powerful! Glory to Allah alone! This is the opinion of haji Sjech Saman Tirou [Teungku Cik di Toro], the servant of those who follow the way (*sabil*) of Allah and fight in the land of Aceh, land of freedom and security."⁷¹

Teungku Cik di Toro died in 1891; his sons Teungku Mat Amin and Teungku di Boekit died in a fierce hand-to-hand battle at Anakgalong on 28-29 June 1896. Captain van Daalen reported that at midnight two battalions marched to Lambaroe, under J. B. van Heutsz. They rested at Lambaroe and then marched to Anakgalong *benteng*, which was defended by 200 men. The battle was over fifteen minutes after the first shot was fired. One hundred and ten Acehnese corpses were discovered; the rest of the men fled. Teungku Mat Amin di Toro's body was carried to gampong Moereue, close to Indrapoeri, and it was buried next to his father in the same grave (*kandang*).

Many relatives of Cik di Toro died fighting the N.E.I., including sons, grandsons, fathers-in-law, brothers-in-law, and cousins. They believed in *jihad*. Many died in different battles that took place in 1911. Cik di Toro's grandson Teungku Ci Amat di Toro (Tengkoe Tjhi Maat di Toro) was killed in the vicinity of Aloe Bhot on 3 December 1911, despite efforts by the Dutch officer to convince him to give up the struggle.⁷² The men who had opposed the Dutch were united by their Islamic faith and learning, but that faith had also been reinforced by family ties.

DAUD BEUREUEH

Daud Beureueh, a contemporary Islamic reformer, functioned as a very important *ulama* in Aceh in the 1940s and 1950s. Daud was the leader of POESA (the All-Aceh Union of Religious Scholars, *Persatoean Oelama Seloeroeh Atjeh*) before World War II. During the Indonesian Revolution of 1945-46 he was military governor of Aceh, but from 1953 to 1961 he led the Acehnese rebellion against the Republican government centered in Java and South Sumatra.⁷³

James Siegel devotes a significant portion of his book *The Rope of God* to Daud. He describes in detail Daud Beureueh's role in the construction of an irrigation channel through use of volunteer labor considered a part of religious duty (*ibadah*). Siegel regards Daud as a good example of an Acehnese religious and military leader who opposed the interests of the Dutch-supported *uleebelangs*. For example, a rival of the *ulama* Daud Beureueh was the *uleebelang* Teuku Keumangan Oemar, who owned many rice fields in the *naggrou* of Keumangan. He prevented Daud from establishing a *pesantren* in his district. He joined the *uleebelang* effort to aid the return of the Dutch after the war and was killed by nationalists in 1946.⁷⁴ The opposition between Daud and Oemar is the direct outgrowth of sociological changes that resulted from the Aceh War.

Basically, the Dutch superimposed an ideology of rulership which stems, to a certain extent, from Hindu-Buddhist political theories. The doctrines of the exemplary center, graded spirituality, and the theater state made up a world-view that remains significant in Indonesia today.⁷⁵ The Islam found in Indonesia is based on the Shiite notion of power emanating from a sacred charismatic individual (*the Imam*) rather than the Sunni concept of the source of legitimate authority stemming from a sacred community (*the umma*).⁷⁶

J. B. VAN HEUTSZ

General J. B. (Johannes Benedictus) van Heutsz (1851-1924) is one of the most colorful characters in East Indies colonial history.⁷⁷ He served in Aceh for varying periods of time after 1874 and was appointed governor of Aceh (1898-1904). As a result of the general perception that he had won the war in Aceh, he was appointed governor general (1904-9). He laid the military foundations for the so-called ethical policy and instigated many of the final military conquests that led to the creation of the N.E.I. colonial state. Parts of the archipelago which had previously been claimed by the colonial government were now aggressively annexed.⁷⁸ By the end of his tenure as governor general, the boundaries of the present nation-state of Indonesia—with the exception of East Timor—had been secured to a large degree.

Van Heutsz was a very complex character. Other than the heroes of the seventeenth-century Dutch revolution against the Spanish Hapsburgs, particularly William of Orange, he is one of the few popular military heroes that the Dutch have ever had. His memory seems to have been respected by Dutch citizens in favor of colonialism in the 1930s and 1940s and

monuments were erected in his memory. Not surprisingly, he is not as highly thought of today; he is viewed by some as an "imperialist" in the negative sense and the epitome of everything that was wrong with Dutch colonialism in the archipelago. Several "Old Aceh Hands" attacked the van Heutsz legend but may have substituted a "Snouck Hurgronje legend" in its place.⁷⁹

CHRISTIAAN SNOUCK HURGRONJE

Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje (1857-1936) was a leading Dutch Islamic scholar who studied theology and Semitic letters at Leiden University. He made a visit to Mecca in 1884-85, disguised as a Muslim, and came into contact with Acehnese and other Indonesian *hajis* there.⁸⁰ He became a lecturer on Arabic at Leiden University (1881-91). In 1891 he went to the N. E.I. and became an advisor on Eastern languages and Muslim law. In May 1893, he submitted a report on the way the colonial government should try to exercise influence, and in 1898 he was given the title "Adviser for Native and Arab Affairs." In fact, he served as the principal advisor to the N.E.I. colonial government on Islamic and native affairs for more than a decade (1891-1906). In 1903 he left Aceh for good, after a sharp disagreement with van Heutsz. In 1906 he accepted the chair of Arabic at Leiden University.

Snouck Hurgronje recommended a ruthless policy of destroying the Islamic resistance in Aceh. He advocated crushing the *ulama* and placing reliance on the *uleebelang*, the secular *adat* chiefs. The colonial government sought out *uleebelangs* to counterbalance Islamic chiefs. Eventually, the policy that Snouck Hurgronje advocated succeeded. The dialectic of history was on his side, since it was unlikely that Islamic control would continue in the face of expansion of capital in the region. "The penetration of the whole archipelago by western capital rendered Atjeh an increasing anomaly and reproach to the Government."⁸¹ The *ulama* carried on their resistance; a group of leading *ulama* was killed in 1910-12. By 1913 the guerilla resistance was more or less finished, but there were sporadic suicidal murders of Europeans ("Aceh murders") until the end of Dutch colonialism.

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The Acehnese reacted against Dutch colonialism largely out of self-defense. A foreign enemy army invaded their country and tried to impose an alien way of life on them.<sup>82</sup> From the Acehnese perspective, the Dutch

were nothing but invaders. The religious leaders had every right to consider their struggle a "just war." Within the framework of Islam they had the right to call the struggle against the Dutch a *jihad*.<sup>83</sup> The Acehnese were fighting in self-defense:

If an army is marching toward one's home, one will naturally prepare to prevent armed men from roaming the streets as conquerors. Common sense says that conquerors can and often do take and destroy anything they want. Protection of the normal, decent order of a community is among the worthiest good that may be safeguarded by war. And indeed, a high percentage of those who have fought wars throughout the ages have done so because enemy armies were bearing down on them and they feared what would happen if they did not fight."

The Acehnese *ulama* and guerilla fighters are usually referred to in Dutch texts dealing with colonialism as "fanatics," but it is clear that the N.E.I. did not recognize the right of the Acehnese to self-determination. Proto-nationalism was also a factor in the Aceh War of 1873-1913.<sup>85</sup>

The Dutch promoted a change in the structural position of the *uleebelang* in the twentieth century because those in power in the N.E.I. thought that the *uleebelang* were the true chiefs of the people. Even as astute an observer as Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje was misled by analogies with feudalistic kinds of arrangements that existed in other Islamic areas. Hence, it is quite possible—as Siegel argues—that the *uleebelang* never were the actual "regents," or district-level officials. The underlying political structure of the sultanate of Aceh was much looser than the Dutch military and civil authorities assumed. It was, for example, quite different from the so-called feudal or—more accurately—patrimonial prebendal structure of Central Javanese states like Majapahit and Mataram.<sup>86</sup> It was not, however, a theater state in the Balinese mold." Aceh was probably different from the kind of centralized system that has been a key to Javanese conceptualizations of power.<sup>88</sup> The situation in Aceh at the end of the nineteenth century was quite different from the political realities of precolonial, colonial, and postcolonial Central Java which have so strongly influenced Indonesia as a nation-state and Indonesian political thinking since independence.<sup>89</sup> The history of modern Indonesia basically has been a history of "personal rulership, patrimonialism, and empire building."<sup>90</sup> There has been a "political construction of tradition" in Indonesia not only about the concept of mutual help (*gotong royong*) but also about the sociological

nature of political culture and structure generally.<sup>91</sup> Use of the KNIL., to pursue the *ulama* made it impossible for those Islamic reformers to promote the kind of universalistic society that Aceh could have become. If it had been recognized that the *uleebelangs* were traders first and chiefs only second then perhaps the war would have had a different kind of sociological outcome.

In summary, it is likely that the Aceh War probably should never have happened. It was a forty-year struggle that resulted from the desire on the part of the Dutch for colonial expansion at the end of the nineteenth century. The consequence of the war, however, was the consolidation of the Netherlands East Indies colonial empire. It was simply assumed by the Dutch that they had a right to that empire.

The empire eventually became the Republic of Indonesia, an important modern nation-state. But the creation of that modern nation-state was at the expense of local indigenous nations, like Aceh. The Dutch governments in the Netherlands and in the Netherlands East Indies were firmly convinced that the Netherlands should consolidate its sphere of influence in the archipelago, at all costs. Furthermore, it was thought at the time that the only way to achieve that objective was through conquest. It was assumed that if the Dutch did not take political control in Aceh then some other European nation, like England, might. Having made a commitment to the war, the Dutch pursued it relentlessly, but without essential knowledge of the true sociological roles of the *ulama*. The mindless campaign of destruction that was waged in Aceh eventually resulted in a situation where the N.E.I. government prevailed and supported the *uleebelang*. Ironically, when the Japanese invaded the N.E.I. in 1942 most of the *uleebelang* were killed by the local population.

## NOTES

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1. For the precolonial history of the archipelago, see B. J. O. Schrieke, *Indonesian Sociological Studies* (The Hague: W. van Hoeve, 1957), vols. 1, 2. Good semipopular overviews on Indonesia can be found in M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan, 1981); and Ruth McVey, ed., *Indonesia* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University, HRAF Press, 1967). The journal *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* [Contributions to Linguistics, Geography and Ethnography] (Leiden, Neth-

erlands: Leiden University, K.I.T.L.V.) is a wealth of scholarly information about Indonesia. Also very important is the journal *Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University).

2. The common Dutch spelling throughout the nineteenth century and up to the end of Dutch colonial rule was Atjeh. The *tj* spelling became *c* in Bahasa Indonesia (B.I.); it is pronounced as the *chin* the English word *church*. The antiquated spelling *A chin* is still used by many library catalogs and can be found in recent articles by English writers.

3. The best-known anthropological study of Aceh in English is by James T. Siegel, *The Rope of God* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969). The central thesis of this chapter—concerning the importance of the *ulama as* reformers—comes from Siegel, as do many specific details. Also widely cited by scholars is Anthony Reid, *The Contest for North Sumatra: Aceh, the Netherlands and Britain, 1858-1898* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1969).

4. See Jeffrey M. Paige, *Agrarian Revolution: Social Movements and Export Agriculture in the Underdeveloped World* (New York: Free Press, 1975). Also see the critique by Larry R. Sproul, "Decadence and Rebellion: A Critique of the Concept of the Moral Economy of the Peasant," in J. I. (Hans) Bakker and Roy Amore, eds., *Culture and Development in Southeast Asia* (Guelph, Ontario: Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies, 1987), 163-72. No fully developed study of peasant rebellion exists for Aceh, but compare, for Java, Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development," in Claire Holt, B. R. O. Anderson, and James Siegel, eds., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), 71-125.

5. The ethical policy was promoted by C. T. van Deventer, a lawyer and member of Parliament, who wrote an essay entitled "A Debt of Honor" (Een Eereschuld). In 1901 Queen Wilhelmina (r. 1890-1948) officially endorsed the ethical policy in the N.E.I. Governor General A. W. F. Idenburg (G-G: 1909-1916) supported "education, irrigation, and emigration [i.e., transmigration]" as central to the new policy. But the policy was possible only because the N.E.I. had been consolidated militarily under General (later Governor General) J. B. van Heutsz. See C. to Lintum, *Nederland en de Indien Gedurende de Laatste Kwart-Eeuw* (Zutphen, Netherlands: W. J. Thieme, 1923), especially 238-56. Ricklefs, *A History*, 143-54, provides a good summary; also see Ricklefs, *A history*, 127, 157, 165, 176, 177, 181.

6. See Karl D. Jackson, *Traditional Authority and National Integration: The Dar ul Islam Rebellion in West Java* (Ph.D. diss., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1971). On the "nation-state" concept generally, see Leonard Tivey, ed., *The Nation-State: The Formation of Modern Politics* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1981).

7. Reid, *Contest*, 14, 51, 57-69, 89, 99, 118, 122, 140, 164, 191-98, 231-35, 266-67, 284-86; text of 291-92. The treaty was made at Aceh's expense; Aceh was neither consulted nor considered in any reasonable manner.

8. See J. A. de Jonge, *De Industrialisatie in Nederland tussen 1850 en 1914* (Nijmegen, Netherlands: Socialistische Uitgeverij SUN, 1976; originally 1968), 130-35, 355-56, 367-68; Richard T. Griffiths, *Industrial Retardation in the Netherlands: 1830-1850* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979).

9. For a succinct and remarkable introduction to the Marxist-Leninist concept of "imperialism" as the last stage of "finance capitalism," see Irving M. Zeitlin, *Capitalism and Imperialism* (Chicago: Markham, 1972). Zeitlin is critical of key assumptions in the Marxist model.

10. Eric R. Wolf, *Europe and the People without History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), sets the stage for this period of world history. Wolf stresses the importance of seeing "European expansion overseas" not only through the eyes of the European conquerors but from the perspective of "the people without history." He contributes to the "autonomous" approach to history that John Smail called for after World War II. See J. Smail, "Indonesia," in Joel Steinberg et al., eds., *In Search of Southeast Asia* (New York: Praeger, 1971), 80-86, 146-54, 281-300.

11. Pim Schoorl's, "Islam, Macht en Ontwikkeling in het Sultanaat Buton," in L. B. Venema, ed., *Islam en Macht* (Assen/Maastricht, Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1987), 52-149, is an excellent historical study of one such sultanate, Buton in Southeast Sulawesi.

12. Reid, *Contest*, 286. "Events in the middle of the century, however, particularly in Borneo, demonstrated that foreign powers would no longer be deterred by an empty claim to hegemony which was ignored by the real rulers of the various states." *Ibid.*, 286.

13. Reid, *Contest*, 286.

14. C. M. Schulten, "Tactics of the Dutch Colonial Army in the Netherlands East Indies," *Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire* 70 (1988), 59-67. H. C. Zentgraaf, *Atjeh* (Batavia, Netherlands East Indies: Koninklijke Drukkerij De Unie, 1939). A rambling discussion of the war by H. C. Zentgraaf presents many interesting, idiographic details that help us to fill out the excellent outline by Schulten. Zentgraaf pays more attention to human aspects of the war.

15. Smail, "Indonesia," 80-86, 146-54, 281-300.

16. Reid, *Contest*, 285-86: "Atjeh's long history as an independent state was founded on a national pride and warlike spirit unmatched in the Archipelago." See T. Iskandar, *De Hikayat Atjeh* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1958).

17. On the sultan's palace and fortress and all matters related to administration in Aceh see the comments by Cornelis van Vollenhoven on *adat* (customary law) in Aceh. A convenient source in English is the translation of some of his work on customary law in J. F. Holleman, ed., *Van Vollenhoven on Indonesian Adat Law* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981), 54-122, especially 58. Van Vollenhoven makes it clear that in 1873 the sultan's Kraton—or more accurately, *dalam*—*did* not represent a significant center of administrative power in Aceh Major or the valley of the Aceh River, much less in coastal, hill, or mountainous areas at some distance from Aceh Major and the valley of the Aceh River. It had wielded some real power in the lowlands of Aceh Major, "but in the highlands, in the dependencies, in Gayoland and farther south it enjoyed homage and respect rather than power." Van Vollenhoven was a leading jurist and academic at Leiden University and the recognized expert on the subject of *adat*. His disciplinary focus is now often referred to as the comparative "anthropology of law." See Keebet von Benda-Beckmann and Fons Strijbosch, eds., *The Anthropology of Law in the Netherlands* (Dordrecht, Netherlands: Foris Publications, V.K.I.T.L.V., 1986), especially articles by G. C. J. J. van den Bergh, "The Concept of Folk Law in Historical Context: A Brief Outline," 67-89; and Franz von Benda-Beckmann, "Anthropology and Comparative Law," 90-109.

18. See M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 137.

19. Schulten, "Tactics," 62.

20. The Dutch declared the war over in 1881. However, that date can be regarded as simply the middle of the first phase of the war. The Dutch attempted to institute civil

government for a time, but guerilla resistance continued and it was eventually necessary to reconstitute military government. Civil government and military government were considered to be held jointly, a precedent that later led to General Nasution's concept of a military with "two functions" (B.I., *dwi-fungsi*), military and civil, in the Republic of Indonesia.

21. For a detailed discussion of the Korps Marechaussee in the Aceh War, in all its aspects, see the memoirs of Captain H. J. Schmidt which were written with assistance from M. H. du Croo, *Marechaussee in Atjeh* (Maastricht, Netherlands: N. V. LeiterNypels, 1943). The Korps was small, with only a few European officers and a few hundred native infantry soldiers. But it was one of the first elite guerilla fighting corps. Captain G. G. J. Notten was the founder of the Korps. The contemporary Dutch Marechaussee, which has changed its fundamental purpose, fills many functions such as passport and customs control at borders.

22. Du Croo, *Marechaussee in Atjeh*. See Schulten, "Tactics," 63-64: "The corps consisted of small so-called brigades of 15 native soldiers commanded by European officers and NCOs. A Remington short carbine, a *klewang* (curved sword) and *rencang* [dagger] were their personal weapons. The Marechaussee fought the enemy using *his* tactics and means, and proved an effective counter-guerilla force." Also see Paul van't Veer, *De Atjeh Oorlog* (Amsterdam: de Arbeiderspers, 1969).

23. There has been confusion about the nature of the local leadership. Van Vollenhoven makes it clear that the *ulama* were legal scholars and pious men but had no distinctive legal status under the sultanate. On the other hand, the *uleebelang* were chiefs and judges under the sultanate, but they were not local leaders. Most executive, judicial, and legislative powers were actually vested in the village headmen (*koecik*) and the village elders (*uroeeng tuha*). The village representative of Islam (*teungku; toengku moenasah*), who might be only barely literate in the use of Arabic script, was also very important in terms of local authority. Consultations (*mupakat; B.I., mushawara*) were regularly held with either the elders or all adult men of the village. The *uleebelang* did not, according to customary law, function as district headmen, even though they did function as judges in certain cases and can be designated as chiefs of a sort. They were basically traders and merchants. They were not like the Javanese *wedana*. The Dutch administration mistakenly assumed that they were. According to van Vollenhoven, that was an error that led to many mistakes. See Holleman, *Van Vollenhoven*, 60, 119-22.

24. The *ulamas*, Islamic religious leaders in Aceh, waged a *jihad*, Islamic holy war, against the Dutch. They were fighting for their religious beliefs and their way of life against an enemy they did not understand. The Acehnese saw the N.E.I. supporting the *uleebelang* who had not always treated them well in the past. Many *uleebelang* had made use of small bands of followers who were like bullies or "thugs" (*rakan*) to exact tariffs from them. It is very likely that average peasants did not regard the *uleebelang* as their natural chiefs. Hence, the peasant petty commodity producers were more prone to support the Islamic religious reformers, the *ulama*, against the Dutch and their Indonesian mercenaries from other parts of the archipelago.

25. Schulten, in "Tactics," 66, says that fear of the *klewang* was well founded because of the Acehnese mastery of technique, fanaticism, lack of fear of death, and better knowledge of the jungle terrain.

26. Schulten, "Tactics," 64.

27. *Ibid.*, 66. Schulten's estimate for 1873-1914 is 2,267 dead and 8,799 wounded among the KNIF forces. However Zentoraaf *Atjeh* 5 estimates 7 707. But such

precision would have been very difficult. For example, some soldiers sent to Java to recuperate must have died, but they may not have been recorded as deaths related to the Aceh War itself.

28. Du Croo, *Marechaussee in Atjeh*. See Schulten, "Tactics," 63-64: "As first organized, the Marechaussee was a 'division' strong, composed of three groups of 4 'brigades' each. Total strength 220 men, all natives except for the officers and NCOs. The corps was extended in 1897 and then numbered five officers and 362 NCOs and other ranks. In the twentieth century its total strength eventually rose to 1,200 men."

29. J. van Goor, *Imperialisme in de Marge: De Afronding van Nederlands-Indie* (Utrecht, Netherlands: 1986). P. Schoorl's "Islam, Macht en Ontwikkeling" is an excellent account of the history of Buton which is helpful as an example of what was happening throughout the archipelago as the N.E.I. state became consolidated after 1870, and particularly after 1901.

30. See Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, trans. and ed. Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978).

31. Randall Collins, *Weberian Sociological Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 85-92, discusses the impact of military technology, such as long-range cannons, and tactics, such as systematic firing and reloading and marching in step, but his conclusions need to be reconsidered in light of the Aceh War.

32. Wolf, *Europe*, 263-392. A representative text that reveals the symbolic myths of the benefits of Dutch rule—myths that were accepted as fact in the 1920s and 1930s—is to Lintum, ed., *Nederland*. The photographs of Dutch and Javanese leaders present a very Eurocentric portrait of the N.E.I.

33. The linguistic origin of the term *Indonesia* is part of the classification scheme which includes *Melanesia*, *Polynesia*, and *Micronesia*. Javanese and Sumatran nationalists who opposed Dutch colonialism in the 1920s and 1930s adopted the term *Indonesia* as a name for the nation-state they envisioned as straddling the whole archipelago. The history of the term is discussed by J. B. Ave, "Indonesia, 'Insulinde,' and 'Nusantara': Dotting the i's and crossing the t," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 145 (1989), 220-34. See Bakker, "Class Relations" and "Patrimonialism," on the Javanese-Dutch "Hindu-Buddhist" patrimonial-prebendal solution to the centrifugal-centripetal dilemma in precolonial and colonial empires in the archipelago. C. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, tends to discuss Indonesian Islam from the Javacentric perspective in order to simplify his comparison with Moroccan Islam.

34. Paul Seabury and Angelo Codevilla, *War: Ends & Means* (New York: Basic Books, 1989), 186. This insightful book takes a comparative historical view of war and presents a cogent, incisive analysis of many issues.

35. This was a defensive enclave established around an area of just over 5,000 square kilometers around the capital city of the Kraton, Kota Raja, with sixteen military posts linked by good roads.

36. A fascinating account of his experiences in Batavia and Bandung is presented by one such chief. He complains that the sultans used to exploit the chiefs. He gives us a very good idea of what the new Dutch-based society in Java must have seemed like to an Acehnese at the turn of the century. His name was Bentara Moeda, or Banta Muda. He was the *ulebelang* of Boengeng and Bago. Between April 1905 and June 1906, he was banned from Aceh for allegedly plotting against the N.E.I. government. When it was revealed that his accuser, Teungko Oesen Oelee Gadjah, was cheating the government, Banta Muda was allowed to return. See the "Hikayat Pentawi [Batavian Tales]" or "Memoires van een

in J. Gonda, ed., *Letterkunde van de Indische Archipel* (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1947), 245-70 (hereafter designated as Banta Muda, "Hikayat").

37. Aceh is a Propinsi Daerah Istimewa, or "special province." The place of Aceh in Indonesia and Southeast Asia is discussed by Mark Dude, *A Grammar of Acehnese on the Basis of a Dialect of North Aceh* (Leiden, Netherlands: Foris Publications, K.I.T.L.V., 1985), 1-8. There are several language groups in the province. The highest concentrations of Acehnese speakers are along the north and west coasts. At the very tip of northern Aceh is Aceh Rayeuk, or Greater Aceh, with the Krueng Aceh, or Aceh River, flowing through the middle of the plain.

38.0. W. Wolters, *Early Indonesian Commerce: A Study of the Origins of Srivijaya* (*Ithaca, N.Y.*: Cornell University Press, 1967), 63 and ff. Note Wolters' extensive bibliography of Mandarin and other Chinese sources, 365-85. Also see O. W. Wolters, *The Fall of Srivijaya in Malay History* (*Ithaca, N.Y.*: Cornell University Press, 1971). The use of the term *Malay* for the early period is more comprehensive than for the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries. The central importance of Malacca (Melaka; Malaka) in the region influenced many aspects of social change in Aceh, particularly in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. See the excellent work by K. S. Sandhu and P. Whetley, eds., *Melaka: The Transformation of a Malay Capital c. 1400-1980* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1983).

39. *Ibid.*, 329, n. 132.

40. H. K. J. Cowan, "Lamuri-Lambri-Lawri-Ram(n)i-Lanli-Lanwuli-Nanpoli," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie* 104 (1948) 429-514. Also see H. K. J. Cowan, "Nogmaals de Middeleeuwse Rijkjes op Noord-Su. matra," *Tijdschrift van het Koninklijk Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap* 5 (1950), 168-72.

41. Cowan, "Nogmaals de Middeleeuwse Rijkjes op Noord-Sumatra," 178-96. Interestingly, the pine species *Pinus merkusii* is known in Acehnese as *sala*, which is one of the numerous Sanskrit names for pine resin, as in the Sanskrit expression *sala-vestah*, "ointment of the sala tree," 106-9.

42. See Dune, *Grammar*, 3: "The Chams were an important power based in the kingdom of Champa in what is now South Vietnam.... They were a significant power until their defeat in 1471 by the Vietnamese kingdom in the north." He refers to several sources including E. W. Lee, *Proto-Chamic Phonologic Word and Vocabulary* (Ph.D. disc., Indian University, 1966); I. V. Collins, *The Austro-Asiatic Substratum in Acehnese* (Ph.D. diss. University of California, Berkeley, 1975). He also mentions the possible importance of Funan and its possible link with Lambri, now known as Krueng Raya. See Cowan, "Outline, 522-49.

43. See Dune, *Grammar*, 2:

From at least the fifteenth century the language of scholarship, royalty, and trade in north Sumatra was Malay [Malayu]. A Chinese embassy in 1416 to the kingdom of Sumatra [in Pase, referred to by the Acehnese today as Syamtalira] reported that its language and customs were that of Malacca, i.e. Malay.... From Greater Aceh itself come several early Malay texts which deal with the activities, customs, and personalities of the port kinds in Banda Aceh; the oldest manuscripts in Acehnese date from the 18th century, of redactions which appear to derive from as far back as the mid-17th century.... Such was the dominance of Malay that the history of Aceh, as written by scholars, is one of a Malay port state.

See also W. P. Groeneveld, *Historical Notes on Indonesia and Malaysia Compiled from Chinese Sources* (Jakarta: C. V. Bhratara; originally Batavia: V.B.G.K.W., 1888); and P. Voorhoeve, "Three Old Acehnese Manuscripts," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 14 (1952), 335-45.

44. Clifford Geertz, in his brief, ideal, comparative analysis of Morocco and Indonesia in *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), tends to deemphasize the importance of Aceh; see, for example, 42:

Sunni Islam did not, [and] today still does not, represent the spiritual mainstream in Indonesia. Its main strongholds on the fringes of the archipelago, un-Indicized enclaves in strategic pockets of Sumatra and the Celebes, and its main support in a marginal social class, itinerant market peddlers, it represented a challenge to that mainstream—a challenge which grew stronger and more insistent as it took deeper root and firmer outline and as a truly national society slowly formed, but a challenge whose force was scattered, whose appeal was circumscribed, and whose triumphs were local.

45. Colin Jack-Hinton, "Marco Polo in Southeast Asia," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 5 (1964), 43-103. See P. Wheatley, *Nagara and Commanandery: Origins of the Southeast Asian Urban Traditions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Department of Geography Research Paper, Nos. 207-8), for background on the city-states of the coastal areas of Sumatra and the Malay Peninsula.

46. G. W. Drewes, "New Light on the Coming of Islam to Indonesia," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 124 (1968). Also see C. Waker, "Malacca's Early Kings and the Reception of Islam," *Journal of Southeast Asian History* 5 (September 1964), 104-28.

47. According to P. M. Holt, "Islamic Millenarianism and the Fulfilment of Prophecy: A Case Study," in Ann Williams, ed., *Prophecy and Millenarianism* (London: Longman, 1980), 337-47, the Shia stem from the partisans of Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad. Ali married Fatima, the prophet Muhammad's daughter. The Alids were "the party of Ali" (*Shiat Ali*) because they were in opposition to the Umayyad Dynasty, founded by a remote kinsman of Ali named Mu'awiya who was the governor of Syria and inaugurated the Umayyad Dynasty (661-750 A.D.). The Ālids had been excluded from power by the Umayyads, but the accession of a new dynasty did not bring them the political advantage they had hoped for. The Abbasid Dynasty, descended from an uncle of the prophet, also excluded the Ālids. Eventually a political faction evolved into a religious sect, or whole range of sects. For a detailed account, see Marshall G. Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), vol. 1.

48. Holt, "Islamic Millenarianism," 338-39, makes it clear that there are both Shiite and Sunni mystical doctrines, such as the doctrine of the Mandi, the expected deliverer of the Islamic community.

49. Compare N. R. Keddie, *Scholars, Saints, and Sufis: Muslim Religious Institutions in the Middle East Since 1500* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), on the *ulama*, dervishes, mandis, walis, and Sufi groups. The *ulama* in the Middle East tended to be more orthodox, while the *ulama* in Aceh accepted certain Sufi practices, like smoking tobacco and drinking coffee for mystical purposes (*khalwa*). The importance of the Islamic movement in general is detailed by Deliar Noer, *The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973).

50. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuyze, *Sarnsill-Din van Pasai, Bijdrage tot de Kennis der Sumatraansche Mystiek* (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1945).

51. Much information concerning the administrative structure of Aceh can be found in scholarly works by C. Snouck Hurgronje and C. van Vollenhoven, whom we will discuss and quote below. A good biography of van Vollenhoven is Henriette L. T. Beaufort, *Cornelis van Vollenhoven: 1874-1933* (Haarlem, Netherlands: H. D. Tjcken Willink & Zoon N.V., 1955).

52. Loeb, *Sumatra*, 224.

53. Siegel, *Rope*, 1-97. James Siegel, the foremost authority on Aceh among English-speaking anthropologists, has argued that the *ulebelang* should be viewed as traders first and foremost rather than as petty chiefs tied to the petty cultivators in their districts. He characterizes them as "entrepreneurs" who should be considered somewhere along a continuum from "pirates" to "merchants." Siegel's thesis concerning the *ulebelang* runs counter to ideas central to the position taken by C. Snouck Hurgronje, the foremost Dutch authority on Aceh, during the Aceh War. Some of Snouck's conclusions, however led to incorrect policy formulations, as discussed by C. van Vollenhoven in his writings on Aceh. Further research on the topic is required. The ideas expressed in this chapter obviously owe a great debt to both scholars, but Siegel's views appear—at least on the surface—to be better grounded in anthropological evidence.

54. Teuku Ibrahim Alfian, "Aceh Sultanate under Sultan Muhammad Daudsyah and the Dutch War," in Sartono Kartodirdjo, ed., *Profiles of Malay Culture: Historiography, Religion and Politics* (Jakarta: Directorate General of Culture, Ministry of Education and Culture, 1976), 147-66.

55. Siegel, *Rope*, 4.

56. D. G. E. Hall, *A History of South-East Asia* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 218.

57. C. Snouck Hurgronje, //et *Gayoland en Zijne Bewoners* (Batavia, Netherlands East Indies: Landsdrukkerij, 1903); and J. Kreemer, *Atjeh* (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 192223), vols. 1,2.

58. T. W. Juynboll, "Atjeh," in *The Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1960), 739.

59. An Islamic reform movement began in the 1780s became known after 1804 as the Padri movement because the leaders were "men of Pedir" who had made the *haj*, the pilgrimage to Mecca, via the Acehnese port of Pedir. See M. C. Ricklefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (London: Macmillan, 1981), 133. Ricklefs' book, in general, provides an excellent introductory overview to the whole vast sweep of the history of Indonesia, but only about six out of more than 300 pages are devoted to Aceh. The significance of the war for the creation of the N.E.I. colonial state is not emphasized. Most of the book concerns Java and the Republic of Indonesia.

60. P. E. de Josselin de Jong, *Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan: Socio-Political Structure in Indonesia* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1980). Also see J. S. Kahn, "Tradition, Matriliney and Change among the Minangkabau of Indonesia," *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde* 132 (1976).

61. A basic introduction in English to Sumatra at the end of the Dutch colonial era is provided by Edwin M. Loeb, *Sumatra: Its History and People* (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Oxford University Press, 1972; first published 1935).

62. See, for example, J. S. Kahn, "Mercantilism and the Emergence of Servile Labour in Colonial Indonesia," in J. S. Kahn and J. R. Llobera, eds., *The Anthropology of Pre-Capitalist Societies* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1981).

63. "*Alem* is derived from the singular form of the Arabic work for *ulama*. In Atjehnese, however, both *alem* and *ulama can* be either singular or plural. To the Atjehnese, *alem* designates a person less learned in Islam than an *ulama*." Siegel, *Rope*, ix.

64. The term *teungku* was originally restricted to those who were considered to be learned in Islam, but it is now used for all men in Aceh. The term *teungku tjihk* was given to the oldest man in the village (*gampong*) who had some learning in Islam. Women in the village who taught girls about Islam were *teungku ineong*. These terms are spelled in many different ways (e.g., *Toeangkoe*, abbreviated as *Tgk*; *teungku cik*; *teungku inung*, etc.).

65. Siegel, *Rope*, 76; also see 255-58.

66. See E. Tyan, "Djihad," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, New Edition, vol. 2 (Leiden, Netherlands: E. J. Brill, 1960), 539: "The jihad is not an end in itself, but a means which, in itself, is evil (*farad*), but which becomes legitimate and necessary by reason of the objective toward which it is directed: to rid the world of a greater evil; it is 'good' from the fact that its purpose is 'good' (*hasan li-husn ghayrih*)." There is little if any recognition among the European KNIL officers of the legitimacy of the moral outrage of the Acehnese guerillas. Instead, the Acehnese are regarded as "fanatics." The term *fanaticism* is never applied to Dutch militarism by Dutch colonial writers.

67. For a semipopular introduction, see Alfred Guillaume, *Islam* (Harmondsworth, G.B.: Penguin, 1975; originally 1954), especially 1-77 on the historical background, Muhammad, and the Quran. *Jihad* is viewed by many Islamic scholars as a doctrine that has been greatly abused but that is essentially a rational doctrine of "just war." According to Islamic scholars, some, if not most, of the wars waged in the name of Islam actually have been un-Islamic. There are many stereotypes and misunderstandings concerning Islamic beliefs both within and outside of Islam. Islamic universalism is very closely related to Christian and Jewish universalism. See Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History* (The Hague: Mouton, 1979).

68. Schulten, "Tactics," 65.

69. Ismail Jakub, *Tendku Tjihk di-Toro* (Jakarta: Bultan Bintang, 1960). Also very important in this time period was the Habib, described by Siegel as the "most successful reformist *ulama* in nineteenth century Atjeh." Siegel, *Rope*, 60.

70. Even though the Dutch East Indies Company (V.O.C., Vereenigde Oost-Indie Compagnie) went bankrupt in 1798 and was replaced by various colonial governments under various Netherlands governments—including, after 1814, the Kingdom of the Netherlands—the inhabitants of the archipelago, including the Acehnese, often referred to the N.E.I. government as *kuempeni*, or "the company."

71. Siegel, *Rope*, 16-17.

72. Zentgraaf, *Atjeh*, 40-43.

73. Siegel, *Rope*, 60, n. 7.

74. *Ibid.*, 87-89.

75. Geertz, *Islam Observed*, 36-43. See Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, Ben Anderson, and James Siegel, eds., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972). The effects of this patrimonial prebendalism in Java in the nineteenth century are discussed in J. I. (Hans) Bakker, "Patrimonialism, Involution and the Agrarian Question in Java: A Weberian Analysis of Class Relations and Servile Labour," in John Gledhill, Barbara

Bender, and Mogens Trolle Larsen, eds., *State and Society: The Emergence and Development of Social Hierarchy and Political Centralization* (London: Unwin Hyman, 1988).

76. Geertz points out, *Islam Observed*, 76:

The "intrinsic" theory of legitimacy, the one which sees authority inherent in the ruler as ruler, traces back, in Watt's view, to the Shia notion of a sacred leader, the *Imam*; the "contractual" theory he traces to the Sunni concept of a sacred community, the *Umma*. The Imam idea stems, of course, from the Shia recognition, and the Sunni rejection, of the claim of Muhammed's son-in-law Ali and his descendants to an inherited, and heritable, right to the Caliphate, the spiritual leadership of Islamic society. The Umma idea stems from the insistence of Sunni jurists on submission to a standardized interpretation of rite and doctrine—their interpretation—as the defining feature of membership in Muhammed's Community, a submission *as* binding upon kings as it is upon shepherds.

See also Hodgson, *Venture of Islam*, vol. 1; and W. Montgomery Watts, *Islam and the Integration of Society* (London: 1961).

77. J. C. Lamster, *J. B. van Heutsz*, 2d ed. (Amsterdam: P. N. van Kampen & Zoon, N. V., 1945). There is no biography of General van Heutsz in English. Like most of the Dutch governor generals and military figures, he has not been discussed in most English-language publications on colonialism.

78. The sultanate of Buton, for example, in Southeast Sulawesi, had been semi-independent under Dutch colonialism; but a small Dutch military force was sent there in 1904-5 and the sultan signed a short declaration of his political allegiance. The situation in Buton was multiplied many times in 1900-1905. See Schoorl, "Islam, Macht en Ontwikkeling." The southern part of the island of Bali—the main center of traditional Balinese rule—was also forcibly taken over at this time. See Geertz, *Negara*. An overview can be found in Hall, *History*.

79. Reid, *Contest*, 277.

80. He was known to the Acehnese as "Toean Beusa Seunot to Waleeta Peureudan," which can be translated as Sir Snouck of Weltevreden, or even "docli Chol Charoenja," His Excellency Snouck Hurgronje. See Banta Muda, "Hikayat," 245-70, for a fascinating account of Snouck's dealings with one *ulebelang* and his wife while they were exiled in Batavia.

81. J. W. Naarding, *Het Conflict Snouck Hurgronje-Van I Heutsz* (Utrecht, Netherlands: Van Daalen, 1938), gives a detailed account of the nature of the disagreement between Snouck and van Heutsz. Neither man supported a more gradual policy of absorption or a policy that would have given some credence to the *ulama*. Reid, *Conquest*, 272.

82. The "defeat" of Aceh by 1913 followed the crushing of the Islamic sultanate of Mataram in Central Java, which had been accomplished in several stages during the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. Geertz, in *Islam*, 40-41, writes:

Ultimate power, in the sense of sovereign force, was, of course, in Dutch hands, though the intensity with which it was asserted was not uniform [circa 1830-1870] over the archipelago. Day to day local administration, however, was almost everywhere in the hands of the indigenous civil service whose members were the heirs of the former ruling class, a kind of white-collar aristocracy. And the symbols of authority, the religio-cultural trappings of command, remained in the conquered courts and the disarmed nobility [of Java] that manned them.

83. Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 39-104.

84. Seabury and Codevilla, *War*, 221. The next sentence is relevant to contemporary conditions. The authors state, "The right of individual and collective self-defense is explicitly recognized in Article 51 of the UN Charter as the only justification for going to war." Of course such a statement was not a part of international agreements in 1873-1913. Nevertheless, the moral principle was applicable even then.

85. Sartono Kartodirdjo, *The Peasants Revolt of Banten in 1888* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). Also see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements in Rural Java: A Study of Agrarian Unrest in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Singapore City, Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1973). Kartodirdjo makes it clear that this proto-nationalism was not yet true nationalism because the leaders had not yet thought of the goal of their struggle as the modern European-style nation-state.

86. See A. Kumar, "The Peasantry and the State on Java: Changes of Relationship, Seventeenth to Nineteenth Centuries," in J. J. Fox, R. Garnaut, P. McCawley, and J. A. C. MacKie, eds., *Indonesia: Australian Perspectives* (Canberra, Australia: Research School of Pacific Studies, 1980). Also 3. I. (Hans) Bakker, "Class Relations in Java in the Nineteenth Century: A Weberian Perspective," *Canadian Journal of Development Studies* 8, no. 1 (1987a), 137-56.

87. Clifford Geertz, *Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali* (Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

88. Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, "The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture," in Claire Holt, Ben Anderson, and James Siegel, eds., *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1972).

89. Herbert Feith and Lance Castles, eds., *Indonesian Political Thinking* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1970).

90. Guenther Roth, "Personal Rulership, Patrimonialism, and Empire-Building in the New States," in Reinhard Bendix, ed., *State and Society: A Reader in Comparative Political Sociology* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1986), 581-91.

91. J. R. Bowen, "On the Political Construction of Tradition: *Gotong Royong* in Indonesia," *Journal of Asian Studies* 9 (1982), 189-240. Also see J. Sullivan, "Kampung and State: The Role of Government in the Development of Urban Community in Yogyakarta," *Indonesia* 41 (1986), 63-88.