


# MANAGING CHANGE

IN

# SOUTHEAST ASIA

## Local Identities, Global Connections



CCSEAS XXI

*Edited by: Jean DeBernardi, Gregory Forth, & Sandra*

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THE HINDU-JAVANESE WORLD VIEW IN JAVA:  
**THE STRUCTURAL ROOTS OF THE PANCASILA STATE**

**J. L (Hans) Bakker**

"The Semar-Pandawa relationship epitomized all that 'a perfect democracy' (quotes added) should be: the harmonic unity of king and commoner, expressed in Javanese as: *jubuhing kawula-Gustj*" (Laksono, 1986:24).

**A. Indonesian Negara and Models of the State**

Models. Scholars have used various labels in attempts to classify the various forms of pegara found in various parts of the geographic entity known since 1850 as the Indonesian archipelago.' The labels explicitly or implicitly involve "ideal type models" of pre-capitalist states. Most such states were "Indicized", influenced by classical Indian patterns of rulership.

Some of the differences among models tend to be merely semantic niceties. It has been widely accepted that Max Weber's ideal type model of "patrimonial prebendalism" is a heuristic analytical tool for analysis of pre-capitalist Indonesian *negara* (see Bakker 1988), although not all scholars agree to what extent the facts fit the model. Those who are strongly opposed to the model tend to introduce a different ideal type model. It is equally possible to criticize the fit between model and facts in those instances. The facts do not speak for themselves, and no one general ideal type model suits the Indonesian situation perfectly, if only because the archipelago itself is so complex. But, speaking in general about the archipelago, it is possible to confirm that the ideal type model of patrimonial prebendalism is extremely useful for understanding Indonesian *negara*. It is a heuristic ideal type model and compares favorably to other models that have been proposed.

In addition to debates concerning the applicability of various ideal type models of pre-capitalist political formations in the archipelago, there are also disagreements concerning the relevance of such models to early capitalist or more contemporaneous time periods. What is the value of developing a model of pre-capitalist Indonesian states if there is no continuity between pre-capitalist and capitalist times? Thus, some would argue that while Weber's patrimonial prebendalism might be of some value in the analysis of pre-capitalist (and pre-colonial) Java or Sumatra, it does not help us to understand Sumatra or Java in the eighteenth century, much less in the twentieth. Thus, the issue of historical continuity is an important one to consider even for the pre-independence period.

The debate becomes extremely complicated because it is not generally agreed what the introduction of capitalism meant to the archipelago. Hence, those who emphasize economic forces might be prone to view models of the state as too limited for general understanding of social change. Others may see the interaction between a pre-capitalist state system and capitalist exchange relations as leading to some form of economic or societal dualism.

Ideal type models are not necessarily limited to "the State" alone, of course; they are not necessarily exclusively political, models. They can also have implications for all aspects

of historical societies in the archipelago, including strictly economic aspects. Hence the use of the term *negara* since there is no equivalently multivalent term in English. Thus, for example, the models are also relevant for comprehension of institutional structures which are not "political" in any narrow sense. The ideal type model helps in the interpretation of such institutional aspects of *negara* as the economy, the culture and the religious ideology. Furthermore, the models also have implications for any analysis of the strictly economic history of a particular place, for example the Javanese portion of the island of Java.<sup>2</sup>

Continuity. Debate concerning the adequacy of different ideal type models — and even the adequacy of the ideal type methodology — may seem to non-academics to be a somewhat fruitless exercise. However, this analysis is based on the assumption that the "academic" exercise of exploring the adequacy of different ideal type models of Java's historical societies is relevant to conceptualization of the structure of the nation-state of Indonesia since political independence (1945), today (1995), and into the twenty-first century. Thus, for example, Bowen (1982) points out that tradition can be politically "constructed"; even as basic a concept of *gotong royong* (mutual help) has undergone significant transformations. Not only does understanding, for example the Dieng plateau in sixth century or eighth century Mataram, help to interpret the New Order politics of the Soeharto "regime"; it also provides a basis for analysis of long-term trends. Thus, for example, work by de Casparis (1985) on the East Javanese village has significance far greater than merely as a contribution to "agrarian history."

I have repeatedly argued that the modern nation-state of Indonesia is best understood in terms of its historical background, understood in terms of comparative ideal type models (e.g. Bakker, 1993). The geographic reality that is called the "Indonesian" (i.e. eastern island) archipelago is far too diverse and heterogeneous to make simple generalizations; but, it is worthwhile to consider the extent to which there are some historical continuities which are directly significant to the current situation. While many people pay lip service to the importance of historical understanding, outside of academia very few commentators have bothered to try to probe very deeply. For many people the only important facts are those which begin with the creation of the Indonesian nation-state in the 1940s, or even the creation of the New Order in 1965-66. Ignorance of the complex history of the peoples of the archipelago is likely to make adequate understanding of Indonesia's current situation impossible. A good grasp of the anthropological and sociological background requires a clear conceptualization of the historical *negaras* of the archipelago, especially those based in Java.

## **B. The Patrimonial-Prebendal Model for Indonesia**

Javanese-ization. Javan societies of the past have had a major impact on Java's subsequent institutional development. In turn, what has happened on Java has profoundly shaped the parameters of what happened in other societies in the archipelago. This analysis will focus on the Javanese *abangan* world view or "ethic." Since the other parts of the archipelago -- and the other parts of the island of Java itself -- have undergone a measure of "Javanese-ization," especially since independence, it seems reasonable to start with the Javanese conceptualization of "sociological" (i.e. socio-cultural-institutional-politico-economic-cultural) perspectives. To understand modern Indonesia it is essential to

understand the classical Javanese pegara. That, in turn, requires some analysis of the underlying ideology of Indic state systems generally.

Mandalas. In previous work I have emphasized the significance of the patrimonial prebendal ideal type model. In fact, my first paper to the CCSEAS concerned that model's applicability to nineteenth century Java (Bakker, 1977). The essence of the patrimonial prebendal model can be expressed as the "Hindu-Javanese" (i.e. "Hindu-Buddhist-Javanese-Balinese") version of the "doctrine of the exemplary centre" (Heine-Geldern, 1942, 1963; Geertz, 1980: 11), a doctrine widely found in Indicized states in South and Southeast Asia.

As I have argued, the concepts of *deva raja*, *chakravartin* and *mandala* are key aspects of the Indic state systems of pre-colonial *pegaras* in the archipelago. Central to Indonesian views of society is the wide-spread notion of a ruler at the apex of a worldly microcosm, linking the mundane world to a heavenly macrocosm. (There are, of course, many overtones to that view found in other times and other places, among people with non-Indic backgrounds.) Thus, for example, the architecture of Borobodur and other notable Indic ruins on Java (and in the archipelago generally) reflects the importance of Indic civilization, *as* modified by Javanese conditions. Indic architecture in Southeast Asia generally (such as at Angkor) is often based on the notion of a *mandala*, a symbolic representation of the order of the universe. One of the main assumptions being made here is that the world view symbolized by the *mandala* is as characteristic of much of the Indonesian elite today as it was more than a thousand years ago.

The centre. The ruler is "the centre of the centre." He is the central focus of the court, which is as the centre of the palace (*kraton*). The palace, in turn, is the centre of the town, or city (*negara*, in the restricted sense). The city is the centre of the ruler's own domain (the *narawita*). And so it goes, a series of concentric circles. (We will return to that metaphor of concentric circles momentarily.) The physical centrality of the ruler is also matched by his spiritual centrality of the life of the *negara* as a whole. The "structure" of classical Indic *negara*, as it developed in the archipelago, is not just a matter of geographic space; it is also a social psychological structure.

Laksono's thesis (1986) is that the "ruler" ("king," "emperor," "sultan") is thought of as an axis point. That is shown in the two by two table.' He is supposed to constitute the basis of a balance of forces. He must be "the great conciliator". Laksono illustrates this notion through a discussion of the work of Soemarsaid Moertono (1968) on Mataram (and its offshoots, the colonial-era Yogyakarta and Surakarta sultanates).

The key to Hindu-Javanese conceptualization of rulership ("kingship") — *as* opposed to strictly Indic concepts — is the rejection of polar oppositions, such *as* the polarities and clear boundaries one finds in the Indian justification of the caste and *jajmani* systems. The ruler's *kasekten* (extraordinary, semi-divine, metaphysical, magical "power") allows for a balance of forces. The ruler is at the "paradoxical centre" of society. In Javanese *wawang* the arche-typal representation of that Javanese propensity to a balance of forces is the character of Semar, the Javanese ancestral spirit and head of the *punakawan*.<sup>4</sup>

It is extremely interesting to note that Laksono, a Javanese, comments (1986: 24, emphasis added): "The Semar-Pandawa relationship epitomized all that a perfect democracy should be: a harmonic unity of king and commoner, expressed in Javanese as: *jumbuhing kawula-Gusti*." The traditional Javanese relationship between *Gusti* (lord, king, authority figure, superior being, *sultan*, *prabhu*) and *kawula* (commoner, ordinary person, *wong kecil*)

is not patrimonial feudal or liberal democratic. For **convenience we can label this an aspect of the Javanese abangan world view, a belief in mystical forces which can be summoned by the heroes of the wawang stories and by successful political leaders.** The "perfect democracy," according to the Javanese way of conceptualizing the matter, is **a system in which the ruler and the people are in harmony (jumbuhing kawula-Gusti).** The ruler is all powerful, but he **is all powerful because he represents the centre of everything and keeps everything in balance.**

### **C. Patrimonial Rulership in Pre-colonial Hindu-Javan States?**

To properly understand the abangan world view as it exists in Java today, it is necessary to examine the historical background. I shall only examine two aspect of Java's history prior to independence in this paper — the Hindu-Javanese States and the Islamic States — with the goal of providing an illustrative perspective on the kinds of arguments that can be put forward.<sup>5</sup> The comparative sociological importance of events which took place during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries have been discussed in various publications (e.g. Bakker, 1983, 1987).

The island of Java consisted of several different types of major and minor "states" during most of its recorded history. Those "kingdoms" practised a system of administration that depended upon tax farming to regional seigneurs, country aristocrats who derived their power and authority directly from the patrimonial ruler. Those seigneurs were not independent landed aristocrats, for the most part They were vested with authority by the "king" (raja, sultan) to gather a tribute. They paid a certain amount to the central ruler and his court and kept the rest

Unfortunately, most of what is known about the so-called Hindu-Javanese states of Java is highly conjectural, based upon the interpretation of a limited number of Sanskrit and Old Javanese texts. Some clues can be surmised on the basis of the assumption that there is continuity between the Javanese states in the Hindu-Javanese time period and the other Hinduized states of Southeast Asia. Scholars speak of a "Hindu-Javanese" culture in Java, rather than merely using the term "Hindu" culture, in order to emphasize the notion that indigenous inhabitants probably greatly modified the Hindu culture and institutions that they received.

It was Indian culture which first assembled local groups and lineages into "kingdoms" under the authority of a single "king". The cults associated with separate lineage groups were brought together into a consolidated political unity, large and powerful enough to create such monuments *as* the artificial mountain Borobudur.

Indian-style kingdoms were formed by assembling many local groups — each possessing its local genie or god of the soil — under the authority of a single Indian or Indianized native chief. Often this organization was accompanied by the establishment, on a natural or artificial mountain, of the cult of an Indian divinity intimately associated with the royal person and symbolizing the unity of the kingdom (Coedes, 1962: 57).

Those Hindu-Javanese states were more than simply a collection of lineage groups; they

were patrimonial states, under the power and authority of a patrimonial ruler.

Weber points out that "Historically there has never been a purely patrimonial state" (Weber, 1978: 237). He also indicates in many ways that the same historical phenomena can have aspects of both "feudal" and "patrimonial" traditional authority, or other pure ideal types.<sup>4</sup> Hence, it is not surprising to read in Naerssen's account of the early Hindu-Javanese states that central authority was somewhat tenuous in the tenth century, when Hindu acculturation became pronounced. Beginning around the time of the raka of Watukura, "king" ("de vorst") Balitung — sometime after 902 C.E. — the struggles for hegemony which had been going on for some time were resolved in favor of Balitung's rule. After that time, according to Naerssen (1977: 41):

The position of the supreme ruler was accepted and regarded as normal, if not *as* just and desirable. Just as several wanuas [i.e. lineages] co-operating under a raka [literally, "older brother"] could accomplish a *great* deal more than if they had each acted on an individual basis, so the supervision of a maharaja [i.e. head over several rakas] could lead to much greater achievements. Hence the possibility of building more temples and constructing large-scale public works.

The new administrative system reflects a set of relations of production which we can characterize as relatively more patrimonial than either segmentary or feudal.<sup>5</sup> The rakas are still powerful at the time of Balitung and may even have constituted something like a "landed gentry", but the major Hindu-Javanese states known to historians show strong centralization.

That is not to deny the fact that a centrifugal-centripetal struggle does not still exist between the rakas and the maharaja. The struggle for central hegemony continued and centrifugal forces continually threatened to bring the maharaja's rule to an end. However, we misunderstand the nature of patrimonialism if we assume that is merely an undifferentiated, conflict-free centralization of power and authority in the hands of a universally acknowledged patrimonial ruler. As Naerssen warns (1977: 39): "we should not underestimate the political power of other rulers at the same time [i.e. at the same time as the maharaja's power], not only before Balitung obtained the hegemony, but, although less evident, also during the entire Hindu-Javanese period" (emphasis added).

Therefore, at certain times it is quite possible that some, more distant Hindu-Javanese states more closely approximate the "segmental" or the "feudal" ideal types than the "patrimonial" one. However, as Norman Jacobs has argued (1964), in response to an analysis of Japanese social structure (Murvar, 1964), the best approximation — when we are discussing ideal types — is that which best summarizes the most characteristic features of a nation's history throughout most of its representative, "typical" periods. That argument is further developed by Jacobs (1958, 1971).<sup>6</sup> For sociological analysis of the Javan case it is also a heuristically fruitful assumption, particularly when discussing the major states.

Hence, in the discussion presented here we shall focus our attention on the two best known cases, the kingdom of Majapahit of the fourteenth century and the kingdom of Mataram of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. (For a review of what *is* known about earlier times see Naerssen's analysis, 1977).<sup>7</sup> We know a great deal concerning Majapahit, relative to our knowledge of other Hindu-Javanese kingdoms before the colonial era, because of the existence of the Nagara-Kertagama by Rakawi Prapanca, which was written

circa 1365 C.E. A complete scholarly edition of that work has been published by Professor Pigeaud (1960-1967) and therefore we can limit ourselves to a few remarks.

The kingdom of Majapahit was both an inland-agrarian power and a maritime power; the "tanah sabrang" of Majapahit may have stretched to parts of Sumatra and Kalimantan (Borneo). The kingdom can be conceptualized as a series of ever-widening circles radiating outward from a central core: the kraton. The successive circles of control are discussed by Selosoemardjan (1962: 23-27), Schrieke (1957), Soemarsaid Moertono (1968) and Smail (1971: 82-85). In Majapahit — as well as other Java states, Hindu-Javanese or Muslim, — the distinctions between kraton court), *nagara*, *nagara agung*, *maha nagara*, and *tanah sabrang* seem to have been quite important. That series of concentric circles has to be kept in mind when we discuss the authority structure of Majapahit itself, since the *Nagara-Kertagama* is not always clear in this respect, an ambiguity which has caused many debates.

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Figure 2

SCHMATIC REPRESENTATION: JAVAN SOCIAL STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION

tanah sabrang

manca nagara

nagara agung

nagara

narawita

kraton

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The prabhu and royal princes live in the *kraton* with other members of the royal family and a few court officials. Officials from the outside areas are expected to stay at the kraton frequently, at least once a year. The *narawita* is the *prabhu's* own domain; he collects a portion of the harvest from the people who live there. The most important official is the *patih* of the *pagara*, the chief administrator. *privavi* who live in the *pagara* are not considered to be the holders of appanage; they are officials within the capital city. *Privavi* in the *pagara* Amu and *manca nagara* are officials, however. The *pagara agung* is considered the "greater capital". The autonomous rulers of lands in the *tanah sabrang* send tribute to the *kraton* regularly. Most of the *privavi* group hold appanages for members of the court nobility who actually possess the rights to them, but do not administer them personally. (See Selosoemardjan, 1962: 23-27).

Failure to distinguish between the administration of the *pagara* and the *pagara agung*, on the one hand, and the *manca nagara* and *tanah sabrang*, on the other, has led some scholars to cast doubt on the extent to which the claims made by Prapanca in the *Nagara-Kertagama* concerning the suzerainty of Majapahit can be believed. There is little doubt that Majapahit could only have exerted nominal control over areas outside of Central and East Java, given the level of communications and transportation. Adi-patih ("Prime Minister") Gaja Mada (1331-1364) was certainly an "empire builder, but -- it is extremely unlikely that

Majapahit had the power that some writers, partially for nationalistic reasons, attribute to it.

Opposition to exaggerated claims should not lead one to a diametrically opposed solution, however.. The tanah sabrang of Majapahit may well have extended to areas as far north as Keda, Langkasula and Patani on the Malay Peninsula. Majapahit probably included a territory equivalent to some nineteenth century German kingdoms. By its very nature, the traditional authority pattern of Majapahit was not overly concerned with political boundaries. The exaggerated claims made by Prapanca probably reflect a desire to create the all important image of a powerful ruler. This leads us to a consideration of the importance of the conception of divine "kingship" for securing political power and authority in Majapahit.

The divine conception of rulership, in particular, served an important function in securing for the Hindu-Javanese patrimonial rulers of such states as Majapahit (fourteenth century) a measure of central political control. In the Hindu-Javanese states, as in other Hinduized states in Southeast Asia, the patrimonial ruler was considered to be a god, at least in theory. In the pararaton the patrimonial ruler of Kadiri (thirteenth century), who was called Kertajava, is spoken of as an incarnation of Siva, the Hindu god of destruction, change and reproduction who was also worshipped as a linga. In the Nagara-Kertagama the patrimonial ruler of Majapahit, who is known as Rajasanagara is also considered an incarnation of Siva.

As Coedes (1968: 23) says "... most of the kingdoms founded in Farther India soon adopted the Sivaite conception of loyalty, based on the Brahman-Kshatriya pairing and expressed in the cult of the royal linga". Coedes cites a famous paper by Bosch (1961) and a paper by Heine-Geldern (1942) to substantiate this generalization.' There is general agreement among scholars that the rulers of Hindu-Javan states either actually considered themselves to be the incarnation of Shiva (or Vishnu) or carefully maintained the fiction of such beliefs for the sake of the maintenance of their power and authority.

By exalting the position of the patrimonial ruler it was possible to foster the impression of legitimacy and unity. Indigenous ancestry worship and animism was heightened by the Hindu-Javanese ideas of the king as "axis" of the universe and the kingdom as symbolically parallel to the architectural structure of the kraton. The cosmic and divine role of the king was emphasized in many ways, especially by the elaborate coronation ritual which was conducted by Brahmins (or other priests). The elaborate description of "the royal prowess" found in Chapter Four of the Nagara-Kertagama (Pigeaud, 1960:20-42) illustrates the extent to which ritual observance was stressed:

The whole expanse of Yawa-land (Java) is to be compared with one town in the Prince's reign. By thousands are counted the people's dwelling-places, to be compared with manors of Royal servants, surrounding the body of the Royal compound. That is the "magnificence that [has] been attained by the Prince's activity..." (Pigeaud, 1960:20)!

Symbols of all kings are adopted in an effort to make the patrimonial ruler seem as powerful as possible and power is treated as something magical and divine. That not every<sup>r</sup> aka believed those cosmic, religious rationales for the Prabhu's (i.e. the maharaja's) power is evidenced by the existence of usurpers; but, those new kings — when successful — invariably adopted the old regalia (Pusaka) and claimed the same magical powers. As

**Heine-Geldern (1942) points out**, the theory of divine kingship based on **incarnation from Siva or Vishnu (or both!)** was a **double-edged sword**. It provided a basis for authority, but it also made usurpation of the throne a matter of court intrigue and murder. The story of Kin Angrok, told in the **Pararaton** (the "**Book of Kings**") illustrates the manner in which the religious foundations of Hindu-Javanese societies shaped both the ideology of politics and the historical reality behind the ideology.

On the basis of prasastis, deeds of transactions between **donors of appanages and donees** of those land use grants, Naerssen is able to provide interesting information concerning the historical reality of agrarian relations of production: For the administrative system of Majapahit he also uses the Purwadhigama, which is a more general type of prasasti for "all the clergy, who adhere to the cult of Siwa" (Naerssen, 1977: 65):

The Purwadhigama then obtained its final form in the heyday of the Majapahit empire, probably at the time when according to the Nagarakrtagama the old prasastis were subjected to close examination. (Naerssen, 1977: 66).

Chapter Twelve of the Nagara-Kertagama provides a list of the patrimonial ruler's domains, as well as other types of land grants and estates. The difference between the royal domains (dharam Haji), of which twenty-seven are listed, and the free domains (dharma lepas) is brought out, for example. Also, there are free Jepas. luput) and independent (swatantra) lands (See Pigeaud, 1962: -219-250 for an extended discussion of Chapter Twelve). The situation is quite complex.

Despite the complexity of the agrarian structure of Majapahit, however, the overall dominance of the patrimonial ruler and his family is pronounced. The king's dharmas (domains) are extensive and are supervised by a large body of officials, many of whom are also priests.

Thus our lord's dharmas (domains) numbered: twenty-seven, in seven-twice born-sun Shaka (1287 - 1365 A.D.), in the Bhadra month (August-September). Equally well-born gentlemen, well-versed, are those whom is given (the charge) to be guardians, in company with sthapakas (abbots), wiku-rajas (Royal Priests), clever in the books of learning. Then an honoured mantri ("mandarin" or official) is given the super-vision over all of those, the honoured arva (Honourable) Wiradhikara.

That is, all of the amatva (well-born gentlemen), sthapaka (abbots) and wiku-rajas (royal priests) were closely connected with the court (kraton) and had to recognize the authority of sang arva Wiradhikara (the honoured Honourable), who was probably a Brahmin, perhaps from India.

That picture of a highly centralized rulership in the fourteenth century has been challenged by scholars writing about the fifteenth century. Thus, for example, Deopik<sup>7</sup> writes: "there existed in the fifteenth century a class of great feudal lords, or bhre, who were unrelated to the prabhu and came to be increasingly in opposition to the prabhu and his traditional officials, finally destroying the prabhu's despotic power, which was then taken over by one of the central provinces" (cited by Noorduy, 1978: 271 n37). That argument has been challenged by Noorduy (1978).

Noorduy's careful reconstruction of fifteenth century Majapahit's historical structure indicates that the various rebellions that occurred may have had the character of internal dynastic quarrels, not conflicts between families established in power and usurpers. Noorduy accepts the "unquestionable decline of Majapahit in the 15th century" (Noorduy, 1978: 209). but questions the

extent to which that decline was manifested internally until quite late in the fifteenth century. The last Prabhu of Java was Bhra Wijaya, the ruling "king" at the time of Tome Pires' visit to Java in 1513 (Noorduyn, 1978: 243). Bhra Wijaya was, according to Noorduyn's view, a descendant of **the same royal kind that rule Java during most** of the fifteenth century. The previously accepted view, introduced by Krom (1931: 426-467), is that the fifteenth century is characterized by "one continuous process of disintegration" (Schrieke, 1957: 65).

That historical question can only be answered by scholars of fifteenth century Javanese history. However, there seems to be at least *as much* reason to believe that the Prabhu was a patrimonial ruler and that the character of his rule was such that no "great feudal lords" could rise up and take over central power, as there is to believe opposite interpretations. At the very least, Noorduyn's work suggests that the theory advanced by Deopik (1977), on the basis of the final section of the Pararaton (quoted by Noorduyn, 1978: 271 n37), contains general errors due to Deopik's reliance on a Russian translation of Brandes' Dutch translation. Noorduyn's thesis tends to lend support to the possibility of patrimonial rule.

In this brief paper we cannot do justice to the period of the Sultans in Java, nor the the early stages of colonialism.<sup>8</sup>

#### D. Contemporary Indonesia

The colonial situation cannot be examined in this brief paper (see Bakker, 1978, 1979, 1983, 1987). The colonial background does not end with the defeat of Diponegoro and the introduction of the cultivation system. Moreover, even after 1870 -- with the introduction of the so-called Agrarian Law — the modifications in Dutch colonial policy and practice did not involve a significant structural change in the ideology of *negara*. Many, if not most, Javanese, Sundanese, Minangkabau and other "peasants" probably assumed that the Sultans of Yogya and Solo were still in power. They were not viewed *as* puppet rulers, even though their political power was negligible. Their cultural significance did not decrease; in fact, it was strengthened. With no possibility of attending to economic, military or other practical matters, the courts emphasized dance, theatre and music. In that sense, the nineteenth century situation was a "theatre state" (Geertz, 1980). The rituals were empty forms, at least viewed from the perspective of practical, pragmatic political and economic decisions. Nevertheless, to many people in the archipelago it was the "forms" that really mattered.

The significant structural change in Dutch colonial policy occurred at the turn of the century, after the supposed victory in Aceh (see Bakker, 1993). At that time the Dutch colony became the entity known to historians *as the* "Netherlands East Indies." In the first decade of the twentieth century, through a series of military struggles — and hundreds of long and short "contracts" — the political entity of the Netherlands East Indies — the basis of the modern nation-state of Indonesia — emerged. Prior to 1910 it had perhaps existed for very brief *time* periods as the Empire of Majapahit, and so forth, but even that is a matter for scholarly debate. It was only after 1910-20 that a true state structure emerged throughout the Indonesian archipelago (excluding, of course, East Timor and Malaysia).

While many significant events mark the twentieth century emergence of the Indonesian nation-state, none of those events constitute a significant change from the ideology of *negara*. The

world view is *as* characteristic of the ideal type "Javanese peasant" in the last decade of the twentieth century as it was in the first Organizational structures like KOPKAMTIB (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order) are not viewed by "average Indonesians" as threats to civil rights.' The presence of the military at all levels of administration is an aspect of the "

of civil rights that are becoming standard in most countries of the North, might refer to the military in Indonesia as *de facto* "martial law," the situation is not viewed that way by the Indonesian masses. Similarly, torture, illegal detention and extra-judicial killings are not perceived as wrong! The reason is simple: it is accepted that the unity and harmony of the *negara* requires strong leadership. It is also believed that a "perfect democracy" is one in which there is harmony between the ruler and his people. A wise ruler will do everything necessary to maintain "order" and stability. A careful reading of Jenkins (1984) interviews with top Indonesian military leaders tends to support the continued impact of a specifically Javanese "idea of power" (Anderson 1972).

There simply is not the same approach to civil rights and human rights in Indonesia as there is in countries like Canada and the U.S. (at least for a majority of their citizens). That is because the historical roots of the Indonesian nation-state are buried in the pre-colonial Indic ideology of the *deva raja* and the *negara as mandala*. A ruler is either powerful or not. If he has power then he has it because he deserves it and he should use it for the good of the community as a whole. The Pancasila State is not a "liberal democratic state," just as it is not a Communist "authoritarian" (Stalinist) or "Fundamentalist Islamic" state. It is also not "totalitarian" or "fascist" in any unambiguous sense.

It is, first and foremost, a type of *negara*, albeit with many modifications of the classical, pre-colonial ideal, an ideal that was probably never realised in practice. The underlying structure, viewed comparatively and in ideal typical terms, can be very well understood in terms of Max Weber's "patrimonial prebendal" ideal type model. The Pancasila State is a neo-patrimonial prebendal state, a post-traditional but not yet thoroughly "modern" *negara*. While there are many contending models (e.g. Levine 1969; Feith and Castles 1976; Reid and Castles 1979) the model which I find most compelling is the Weberian ideal type model. It helps to explain many aspects of the relationship between the state and the society (Mulder 1992) and seems to do justice to the complex diversity of Indonesia's social, cultural, economic and political past. It is a useful heuristic tool. Unlike some of the ad hoc categorizations that have been used (e.g. "praetorianism" in Jenkins 1984: 14-20; "theatre state" in Geertz 1980: 62) the Weberian ideal type model is well established in the literature and allows for comparative analysis of different political and cultural systems.

Of course, when one looks at historical structures panoramically -- taking the whole expanse of history in very general and abstract terms -- then the introduction of individual civil rights is a relatively new phenomenon. The concept of a universally applicable standard of individual human rights stems from Enlightenment thinking, but it has only been widely accepted by "rich" countries since World War II. When one begins to examine the history of the new nation-state of Indonesia during the colonial era -- and the manner in which the colonial era was an outgrowth of pre-colonial Indic state structures -- then it is easier to understand why the elite in Indonesia would rather have political stability and economic growth than true representative democracy and civil rights.

There is much more that needs to be said concerning the origins of the current situation in Indonesia. This paper has attempted to contribute to a better understanding of the historical background. We have touched on the ideology of *negara as mandala* and the colonial antecedents to the Indonesian nation-state. Further research on several topics is required. Those topics include:

1. Public opinion polling among the Indonesian masses;
2. Careful analysis of the current military elite;
3. Monitoring of recent trends towards liberalization, such as increases and decreases in freedom of the press and use of public rather than private trials;

4. Indications of the potential for a strengthening of representative democracy (e.g. Little, 1992); and
5. Comparative analysis of other ideal type models of pre-colonial *negara* (Reid and Castles, 1975).

However, even without that detailed research it is possible to make some general statements. The current military and civil elite in Indonesia is largely **abangan** in its sympathies; it is not fully committed to liberal democratic notions of representative democracy or Islamic notions of an Islamic, theocratic state (i.e., without a separation of church and state). While there may be groups in Indonesia who genuinely wish to move to a representative democracy, *just as* there are groups which would like to institute an Islamic state, the general tendency is to maintain the *negara* along lines which — viewed structurally in ideal typical terms — are analogous to pre-capitalist Indic states. The Pancasila state philosophy functions *as a* "civil religion." While the initial formulation of Pancasila under Sukarno may have had other, more "liberal" nuances, the contemporary interpretation of Pancasila rejects representative democracy just as clearly as it rejects Islamic fundamentalism or Communism.

1. The Pancasila State is a government which rejects "Islamic fundamentalism." The purpose of the first clause of the state philosophy is not so much to hinder those who do not have faith in a God as to make it clear that faith in a Christian or Catholic God is as acceptable as faith in Allah. In order to make the notion of belief in God credible it is assumed that Hinduism and Buddhism are also monotheistic, even though Hinduism is probably best described as "henotheistic" and Buddhism is essentially "non-theistic."

2. The Pancasila State also rejects all forms of "Marxist-Leninism" (or, generally, any form of "Stalinism" or "Communism"). The events of 1965-66, in which hundreds of thousands of people died, were a "purge" of those segments of the population who sympathized in any manner with Communist ideologies. For the average Indonesian citizen any favorable mention in print of Communist ideology can be dangerous. The civil rights of individuals suspected of Communist sympathies have not been recognized by the New Order.

3. However, while it is not at all clear if **One simply** looks at the wording of Pancasila, the New Order Pancasila State also largely rejects what might be called the "liberal" view of society and the state. While there are elections in Indonesia, they are quite different from elections in most capitalist societies of Europe or former White Settler colonies. While there are various kinds of legislative assemblies in Indonesia, they do not function like parliaments in the "North." Although Indonesia has many of the trappings of modern, liberal, bourgeois democratic freedoms, the "balance of powers" do not allow for "checks and balances." The state apparatus is dominated by the executive branch.

When President Suharto leaves office (or dies) it is unlikely that the Indonesian situation will change significantly, unless there is outside intervention. The chances for an Islamic, Communist or Liberal Democratic structural change are small. The Pancasila State is not the invention of one man, no matter how closely he may be associated with the history of that state since 1965. In the foreseeable future the Indonesian state will continue to be anti-Communist, anti-fundamentalist Islam, and — somewhat more ambiguously — anti-liberal democracy. It will continue to operate like a classical *negara*, albeit with an expansion of bureaucracy and an adaptation to modern technology and

trade.

Many of the abrogation of civil liberties in Indonesia are due to the lack of a tradition of liberal democracy. Indonesia has not accepted the International Bill of Human Rights of 1948, nor has it adopted the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Sullivan, 1991). The civil and human rights of Indonesian individuals are not as well protected as they are for the majority **of people in the rich countries of the so-called "North."**

**For** example, the civil rights of most citizens in Western European countries are much better respected by the "state." Similarly, citizens of former "White Settler Colonies" (the U.S., Canada, Australia and New Zealand) are much better protected than the civil rights of Indonesian citizens. Of course, immigration policies restrict entry to most countries of the North. Furthermore, the Native (or t aboriginal) people of former White Settler Colonies may think about the civil rights picture in their " nations" somewhat differently. Nevertheless, there is no denying the obvious examples of abuses of civil and human rights.

Many people and organizations denounce the human rights picture in Indonesia with pointed wrath. They describe the loss of life in East Timor or Irian Java and the continued role of the military in Aceh (and other trouble spots) and classify Indonesia as one of the worst violators of human rights in the world, along with Vietnam and China. However, such denunciations of Indonesian society are not grounded in a comparative and historical framework. They are based on acceptance of abstract principles of justice and human rights that rich countries of the North are themselves having difficulty living up to. That having been said, it would be wrong to in any way detract from the importance of the abstract principles themselves.

However, apart from purely philosophical conjecture, we need to attempt to analyze the situation sociologically, using a comparative and historical framework. The human rights picture in Indonesia will not improve simply as a result of denunciations. We need to know why Indonesia is the way it is. The roots of the current situation lie in the distinctive history of the abangan viewpoint, particularly the central role of the ruler as the lynch pin of society. For most Javanese, and indeed for most Indonesians, a "perfect democracy" is one which is based on a "harmonic unity" between ruler and ruled. Until that changes the human rights picture will not change dramatically either, regardless of who functions as the ruler or what group is in power. Only a dramatic change from the ideology of patrimonial prebendal rulership and patron-client "abangan" social structure to some other ideology and "political economy" would promote a structural transformation of Indonesian society.

## **NOTES**

<sup>1</sup>I am using the term *negara* in the same manner as it is used by Clifford Geertz (1980) in his book on Bali. *Negara* ( *n*<sub>agari</sub>, *negeri*) is a Sanskrit loanword and has diverse meanings. "It is, in its broadest sense, the word for (classical) civilization, for the world of the traditional city, the high culture that city supported, and the system of superordinate political authority centered there" (Geertz, 1980: 4). However, I do not fully accept all aspects of Geertz's abstract, so-called "ethnographic" model of the structure and functioning of the "theatre state." Much of what he says about topics like "clientship" should be considered in "ideal typical" terms but he makes a somewhat facile rejection of Weberian ideal type models (Geertz, 1980: 6). Also, although Bali may not have conformed well to the patrimonial prebendal ideal type model because *parekans* were not generally used as

appanage holders (Geertz, 1980: 175, footnote) that does not mean the model cannot be heuristic for an examination of the archipelago *as a whole*.

2. Unfortunately, most authors do not carefully differentiate between the "Javanese" and things "Javan." The Sundanese, for example, also live on the island of Java, as do many Madurans and Balinese. Furthermore, in the contemporary Indonesian nation-state there are many Javanese who do not live on Java and never have.

3. See Figure 1. Laksono's analysis is based on earlier work done by Heesterman (1985), so I have labelled it the Heesterman-Laksono model

4. The punakawan assembly comprises Semar and his three foster-sons Gareng, Petruk and Bagong, *as well as* Togog and Bilung. In wayang mythology Semar and Togog are really gods. Togog, the eldest, is the god Batara Antaga; Semar is the god Batara Ismava (the Javanese ancestral spirit). The third god is Shiva (Siva) in the form of Batara Guru, the great teacher who rules the celestial kingdom of the gods.

5. Unfortunately, there is no room here for the analysis presented in the original conference paper of the influence of the Dutch between 1677-1830. My work on the cultivation system period, 1830-1870, can be found summarized in Bakker, 1988. My work on the turn of the century and the creation of the Netherlands East Indies state can be found in Bakker, 1993.

6. The Heine-Geidern article has been reprinted frequently. It is cited by Geertz in The Religion of Java (New York: Free Press, 1960: 231) and in many books on Java. Heine-Geldern, however, is not necessarily considered a scholar of Old Javan (i.e. Sundanese, Madurese, Javanese) history.

7. The study of D.V. Deopik, cited by Noorduyn, is available only in Russian. it is entitled Malajsko-Indonezijskie Issledovanija (1977, especially pp. 25-41). It has not been possible to obtain a translation of Deopik's discussion.

8. See Bakker, J. I. (Hans) "The Hindu-Javanese World View in Java: The Period of the Sultanates and early Netherlandic Colonialism" Paper prepared for presentation at the Canadian Council for Southeast Asian Studies annual conference, October 27-29, 1995, Universite Laval, Quebec.

9. The KOPKAMTIB was changed to BAKORSTANAS (Coordinating Agency for the Reinforcement of National Stability) in 1988. The new organization is more closely monitored and structurally different; however, it functions in much the same manner.

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